Sunday, August 26, 2007
Magazine to the DK Central Committee
Honorary Red Flag Letter to the Central Committee, 1977
[UNEDITED]
Letter of Honorary Red Flag
From
Communist Party of Kampuchea's Central Committee
To
Male and Female Cadres and all cooperative farmers in the districts of Prasot (Eastern Zone), Kampong Tralach (Western Zone) and Tram Kak (Southwest Zone)
Unofficial translation by Bunsou Sour
Documentation Center of Cambodia
I. Preamble
In order to encourage the active involvement of the masses to achieving the tasks of defending country, continuing and building socialist revolution with the speed of great leap forwards in consecutive years, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, hereby decides that any district with the best qualifications in terms of defending the country, continuing and building the socialist revolution, is entitled to be awarded Honorary Red Flag.
In 1976, when we have just come out of the war, there were shortages of anything. In the face of it, all bases, entities, and ministries upheld the flag of combat, while storming attacks to vigorously fulfil the party's tasks, with the spirit of high devotion. As a result, the political tasks of all fields set for 1976 was achieved with maximum quality, including national defense, protection of our revolutionary outcomes, continuation and building of socialist revolution. Obviously, a concrete foundation was laid for all bases, entities, and ministries to move forward to achieving political tasks of 1977 with great victory in all fields.
In the great revolutionary movement throughout the country in 1976, the party had observed and noted three districts, which can be considered as a role model in the three fields—defense, continuation and construction of socialist revolution.
The three districts are:
1. The district of Prasot, Eastern Zone;
2. The district of Kampong Tralach, Western Zone; and
3. The district of Tram Kak, Southwest Zone.
1. Exemplary fields of production and settlement of problems arising from people's living conditions. The fact is that, these three districts are poor, having farming soil with less quality. Villagers had been living in poor conditions since the old regimes. However, their rice production climaxed as a result of the implementation of the party's 1976 plan. Sufficient seeds were well prepared, problems of people's living were tackled, while much a mount of rice went to the state.
2. Exemplary stand: Independence, self-reliance in fulfilling the tasks of building socialism, in order to achieve the party's plan of three tons per hectare.
3. Exemplary stand of socialist revolution: Good work in this field. Active involvement and deep engagement in class struggle in the whole districts, especially in the party.
4. Exemplary stand of collectivism, devotion, consciousness of broad solidarity, both in the frameworks of district, region, and zone.
In recognition thereof, the CPK's Central Committee, decides to award Honorary Red Flag 1976 to these three districts.
II. Honorary Red Flag Award
Respected and Beloved male and female cadres and all cooperative farmers of the districts of Prasot, Kampong Tralach and Tram Kak:
In 1976, which had just passed by, all of you, both cadres, male and female cadres and cooperative farmers, heightened our spirit of sever struggle with the stand of independence and self-mastery in breaking obstacles of all kinds. Eventually, you all have your jobs well done in the fields of national defense, protection of our revolutionary outcomes, continuation and construction of the socialist revolution. This make the three districts of yours enjoy rapid progress, which is qualified as model of 1976 for the whole country, aiming to provoke a movement committed to achieve the party's 1977 plan with the speed of great leap forwards in all fields.
1. Exemplary fields of production and settlement of problems arising from
people's living conditions. The fact is that these three districts were poor,
having farming soil with less quality. Villagers had been living in poor
conditions since the old regimes. However, their rice production climaxed
as a result of the implementation of the party's 1976 plan. Sufficient seeds
were prepared, problems of people's living were tackled, while much a
mount of rice went to the state.
2. Exemplary stand: Independence, self-reliance in fulfilling the tasks of building socialism, in order to achieve the party's plan of three tons per hectare.
3. Exemplary stand of socialist revolution: Good work in this field. Active involvement and deep engagement in class struggle in the whole districts, especially in the party.
4. Exemplary stand of collectivism, devotion, consciousness of broad solidarity, both in the frameworks of district, region, and zone.
This is a prominent victory of your comrades. Also, it is the prominent victory for our people as a whole, our army, our revolution and our party.
This is a significant contribution to the promotion of country defense, socialist revolutionary movement and construction of the socialist revolution, settlement of problems arising from the people's living.
Therefore, the CPK's Central Committee would like to appreciate with revolutionary sentiment—touched and warm—to your cadres, and in recognition thereof, award Honorary Red Flag 1976 to all of you.
Beloved comrades,
Your districts have received the Honorary Red Flag 1976 from the party. This is a great honor for our party, our cooperative workers and farmers of the whole country as well as our army to award your comrades. It does imply that your tasks have been finished by this moment. All beloved comrades have to further extend your exemplary qualifications by:
1. Strengthen and extend the 1976 triumph of yours, by drawing on the past experiences in political, ideological, and organization fields, force distribution, technical work, defense tasks, continuation and construction of socialist revolution, etc.
2. Further strengthen and extend the stand of collectivism, socialism, self-mastery, high spirit of revolutionary responsibility, stand of overcoming obstacles of any sorts, for the sake of more successes. In doing so, there must be firm stand, constant revolutionary politeness, thorough internal solidarity and solidarity with other bases.
3. Model upon the general revolutionary heroism of our people, cooperative workers and farmers. Our army's valiancy is also to be copied. By doing so, your comrades will improve yourselves rapidly in the party's political, ideological and organizational fields for the sake of your beloved comrades' district progress following the plan of 1977 and the years to come.
4. Based on your comrades' basic qualifications, combined with the active engagement, comrades have to achieve the party's 1976 plan of 3-6 tons per hectare without fail. Surplus would also be awarded.
With the warmest and deepest revolutionary sentiment, the CPK's Central Committee would like to wish your comrades consecutive successes in fulfilling the brilliant tasks assigned by the party.
The CPK's Central Committee is strongly convinced that other districts and bases will achieve the party's 1977 plan in all fields, like the districts of Prasot, Kampong Tralach, and Tramkak, and even bring about more improvement. Accept, comrades, our greetings with the warmest revolutionary fraternity.
June 30, 1977
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea
Drawing experiences on the political, ideological and organizational stands in the great revolutionary movement of the first six months of 1977
Requests of this text:
1. The great revolutionary movement under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in the past 6 months met a number of problems, enriching us with even more knowledge of political, ideological and organizational stands in defending the country, protecting the authority of the revolutionary workers and farmers for the continuation and construction of the socialist revolution. We altogether do the best to conduct research and shed more light to the main lessons, which are either principles or guidelines for the future practice.
Draw on the experiences and find more directions to attack enemies for defending the country, protect the revolutionary authority of workers and farmers of the party. Draw on the better experiences and find directions which motivate the construction of socialism, significantly the implementation of the 1977 plan, in the fields of country building and settlement of people's living problems. We have to find out keys to them so that more storming attacks would be launched.
We have to be clear on the issues of leadership. Leadership in the party, in all bases—from the highest to the lowest levels.
2. In order to be well prepared for the ultimate attacks in the second half of 1977, leading to a complete achievement of the 1977 plan in all fields.
Therefore, to reach this goal, we raise a variety of issues, which have already been done in 1977, for examination:
We draw on:
1. Tasks of defending the country, [and] revolutionary authority of workers and farmers of the party.
2. Tasks of making socialist revolution.
3. Tasks of building socialism, achieving 3-6 tons per hectare.
I. Tasks of defending the country of Democratic Kampuchea, protecting the revolutionary outcomes, the revolutionary authority, the party, the classes, people and the revolution army of Kampuchea.
1. Country defense—External Affairs.
As far as the country defense is concerned, in general, we are in complete control and self-mastery of all boundaries: land boundary [and] territorial water, sharing borders with other foreign countries.
The main reasons that our collective people and revolutionary army achieved this work:
- [They] have implemented correctlyy and thoroughly according to the party's political lines on country defense.
- [They] have had stand of high revvolutionary vigilance toward the enemies.
- [They] have had correct line of aactivities in the field of defending the country.
In the country defense movement, i.e. external affairs, we perform correctly and thoroughly according to the party's country defense political lines. The following are our experiences of political and ideological stand:
- Our party, people, and revolutionary armyy, know even more clearly the image of the enemies—without any confusion and dubiety. Our stand of limiting friend-and-enemy is strengthened among our party, people, and revolutionary army by the way the enemies committed against us: aggression, expansion, shelling, strafing, espionage, sabotage, stealing of cattle, annexation of land for cultivation along the border areas.
Based on the vivid definition, we enjoy even more active wrath-abetting movement towards enemies of our nation, people, revolution, worker-class, collective socialism, and of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. At the same time, stand of patriotic consciousness, loving people, loving the revolution, loving the worker class, loving the collective socialism and the loving party are strengthened.
- [We] become increasingly aware off and adhere to the stand of high responsibility in the area of defense of the Democratic Kampuchea.
- Moreover, going through the counttry defense movement, certain negative stands are abolished: middle-of-the-road stand, country defense in an inactive manner, country construction-ism, seeing no antagonism with the enemies of our nation.
To sum up, our party, people, and revolutionary army manage to defend the country with complete self-mastery, based on the party's correct stand and guidelines on country defense.
2. Defending the country, the revolutionary authority of workers and farmers within the country.
1. Country defense among the people:
The country defense among the people are moving on track because of good awareness and implementation of solidarity guideline, [and] outstanding gathering of party's forces. More significantly, poor worker and peasant class and middle class farmers are stronger and extended, becoming a solid foundation for the socialist revolutionary movement.
[We must] carry out indoctrination on the political and ideological guidelines among the people, especially those in the local bases. There appears to be more active in terms of this area. Selection, strengthening and extending of organizations are smoothly implemented, making the components among the people become purer.
Meanwhile, [we] settle the problems of people's living step by step, making the people increase their belief in the party, the revolution and revolutionary army.
Drawing on our experience, if revolutionary authority in local bases is settled properly, i.e., if cooperative is strengthened positively and carefully screened, a maximum of people safeguard will be warranted.
2. Defense inside the party and in our rank
Situation of defense inside the party and in our rank is much better than before—in terms of both quantity and quality. Obviously, we have screened the party—from the top to the bottom. Basically, many bases have already been settled, except some which remains to be done later.
The screening of networks of enemies burrowing inside improves the quality of the party, revolutionary army, male and female combatants as well as the quality of a majority of the people, who know the antagonism between us and enemies and other experiences in eliminating burrowing enemies and attacking enemies.
Needless to say, the quality of our party increases, both in political, ideological, and consciousness areas. These experiences should be further acquired from within our party, revolutionary army and people in order to wove into a net for defeating and dealing with burrowing enemies.
However, enemies burrowing inside do not cease to exist yet. The old enemy networks of all sorts are not completely removed. A few remains in bases, entities, offices or ministries.
How can we settle the problems?
1. [We] must hold a clear stand and view that we haven't yet cleaned burrowing enemies a hundred percent. The remainders enjoy extending themselves.
2. [We] must take absolute measure in zero-tolerance manner and without hesitation.
The procedure of eliminating enemies burrowing from within expires four months already. Please be reminded:
1. Encourage and educate the masses in the party, core organizations, revolutionary army and among the people so that they are clearly aware of how the burrowing enemies act. By this way, they will become forces in search of enemies and attacking enemies. The same applies to each ministry, base, and army. We move step by step. Wherever measures (of eliminating enemies) are available, there must be encouragement and education for the masses so that they become forces in search of enemies and eliminating enemies.
2. Essence for searching for the burrowing enemies must be the one of the party's political, ideological and organizational guidelines. Check them up to make sure they are correct. In this context, what is to be taken as a core? The answer is the party. Obviously, party center is the core for the whole country. The same applies to zone, region, district, office, ministry. Each spearhead has to have its core [forces] in sweeping burrowing enemies away.
CERTAIN EXPEREINCES IN ADDITION TO OURS FROM APRIL 1977.
1.To be in self-mastery in advance and to take measure on the right time, there must be a clear view toward the constant antagonism, while holding a clear view that enemies of all strips have their running-dog agents burrowing within ourselves. Hold this stand in advance, while having the spirit of high revolutionary vigilance. And keep track of any small phenomenon.
2. In order to keep an eye on and search for enemies, [we] must base on our the positive biography, both in a prior and post revolutionary period. It must consist of personal, social and commercial background. Among others, the date of entry into the revolution and name of introducers must be included. We used to work in this field with less attention. This really affected our party's principles, making the enemies burrowing within [our party] increased in number. We didn't expect that we paid such less attention. We held subjective view. Some elements came closer to hold important positions. These individuals have had connections since 1955. Generally speaking, [they have been] with the movement for a long time. Yet, we were morally lax in grasping hold of their histories. We didn't know their circles before their entry into the revolution.
3. In order to make sure whether they are bad or good elements, enemies or non-enemies, there must be examination of application of the party's guidelines. How they practice the party's political guidelines? How are their political, ideological and organizational realities? How their implementation of country defense guidelines? How do they work in terms of socialist revolution [and] construction of the socialism. Left[ism] is wrong; right[ism] is wrong. One, two, or many leftist activities or systematic rightist activities cause a problem. Where complicated problems occur consecutively which can not be solved, that is problem. Consecutively practicing socialist revolution with leftism and rightism is problem. Moral laxness in practicing the guidelines of the construction of socialism is problem. Failing to solve the problem of people's living on a constant basis is problem. Our experiences show:
- In certain zones, traitorous elemments burrowed from within and implemented systematic political, ideological and organizational activities in the wrong ways. They were morally wrong in the systematic manner. Shortcomings occurred one after another.
- There were always disputes among districts, which share the borders with each other. We knew that there had to be enemies, who, by our assumption, were new evacuees.
From the above experiences, we assume that both the country defense, socialist revolution, and construction of socialism must be based on political position, fighting the enemies until gaining victory. If we could not attack enemies burrowing inside, it does not make sense to win victory in the field of country defense, socialist revolution [and] construction of socialism. Only getting rid of enemies burrowing inside from small and big organizations, do it means that we can implement the party's guidelines. Real example from 1976 is evident. Therefore, we must basically rely on the fight against enemies in order to defend the country, make the socialist revolution and build socialism. Our masses must be aware of this issue. We must constantly fight the enemies. Fight and then substitute our core [agents]. Masses can also be our core [agents].
4. Problems arising from our activities of attacking enemies. Class issue become even more complicated. Many of traitors are petty bourgeois class. Among which there are a few peasant class, who actually have no nature of peasants. They become fake petty bourgeoisie, whose performance are overwhelmed with joy.
In summary, it appears that enemies find it so easy to lure [people] on the petty bourgeois circle, because such a class enjoy individualism, dogmatism, resentment, [and] have tendency to confession [admission]. Their speech, even a word, is always in fluctuating manner.
Other peasants, in bases or ministries, who are also traitors:
- Some of them have been an enemy aagent for long time ago or elements are by the side of enemies.
- Many others are those who are undder the control of petty bourgeoisie. They don't understand; they can not awake, as the petty bourgeoisie always curb them. The petty bourgeoisie prevent them from enjoying the guidelines, rights, [and] party's statute.
In other words, petty bourgeoisie are a source easy to be convinced by enemies. They take the victorious occasion as a time for over-enjoyment, drinking, in a debauchery manner...
Resentment, in any circumstances, and more or less, makes ways for enemies to carry out their enticement. The problem is the jealousy stemming from position promotion in different times and other contradictions. Taking this opportunity, enemies try to provoke troubles, while petty bourgeoisie are motivating others to feel resentment toward the party.
Worse still, it brings about frustration and complicated situation. It implies that all circumstances in favor of enemies are available. This is an experience. The petty bourgeoisie [of this kind] include those from cities, rural areas, those who give up monkhood, or middle-class peasants or vendor-peasants. Enemies find it harder to entice base people than middle-class. So, we have to stand firmly on the party's guidelines. Before we implemented the party's guidelines. But we were morally lax. From now on we have to practice the party's class guidelines with great quality, tantamount to "great leap forward".
5. Another experience, we have to rely on the masses to attack enemies. In doing so, masses have to be educated about political and ideological areas so that enemies could not be broadened.
For example, we have established a new place [of new elements]. Once we went to that place, we were not able to find all enemies, while enemies were able to carry out their activities to some degree, as the masses were not aware of that. We encouraged the masses. As a result, they found enemies one after another. Therefore, we have to make the masses understand, and the party have to be the backbone of the masses.
Experiences from another place. We made the masses convinced. If they were confident in the ministerial committee(s), they would report to the committees [and] party branches. They did not produce anonymous reports. Yet, they had to be completely responsible for the reports. Experiences tell us that bases also can do this job.
II. Implementation of tasks of the continuation of the party's socialist revolution
We have strengthened and extended our collective socialism. As the collectivism of proletarian class are not to shake and reject, and due to the mass movements under the leadership of the party, on the one hand we manage to control situation where we eliminate all oppressing class, which are becoming faint gradually. On the other hand, all private regimes can not raise their heads. They are under the control of the mass movement, who are going deeper. The tools of the oppressing class, namely currency, market, etc., can not be returned. The mass movement are in the process of curbing it. This is a phenomenon, indicating our victory in the continuation of the socialist revolution. Enemies of all strips are not able to re-exist. Instead, they are on the way to a complete collapse.
In this situation, we continue to storm attacks to sweep enemies away. Defeat and attack such enemies as international agents, enemies burrowing inside, class enemies to a degree that they could not make any reaction, even a little.
Another advantage is spirit of consciousness inside the party, the army, poor peasants and lower middle-class farmers and middle-class farmers. They are satisfied with the socialist revolution. This is the consciousness of political and ideological areas.
In the last six month, our people worked vigorously with revolutionary optimism. This is recognized by the way they:
1. have enough to eat, good health and are satisfied with the collectivism. Moreover, they are enjoying better shelters and medicines for the safeguards of themselves as well as their children. During the post-war period, our brothers and sisters see outcomes themselves. That's why the revolutionary movement in the field of country construction become very active with revolutionary optimism. They are content to have reservoirs, dams [and] canals. They witness the accomplishments of themselves and of the poor farmers and middle-class farmers. They are contented and feel proud. Most of them are absolute. Poor farmers, lower middle-class farmers and middle-class farmers general farmers, and even petty landlords who had suffered the war of aggression are also happy. New components following April 17, [1975] also accept this regime.
In total, 95 per cent acknowledge the collectivism of the party's proletarian class.
At the same time, shortcomings still occur. People and [those] in the [revolutionary] rank lack awareness of the brilliant collectivism. The reasons are:
1. our party has not encourages the involvement of the local masses; and
2. the enemies in the rank deviate and indoctrinate wrong concept.
From now on, the revolutionary army, male and female combatants, young and old, must be educated from the top to the bottom. Their level for education have to be classified. Education at lower level must be deeper. In case of mixed components, there must be stretch-out education.
Dig up people forces for their potential engagement along with political and ideological indoctrination. Just a meeting a lone will not do. Indoctrination must be the must.
Our second shortcoming is that food ration of our people in this raining season is reduced a little bit. It makes people feel upset to some degree. Of course, we have to solve this problem. It must be done as our collectivism is fantastic. Our mobile units can be moved to anywhere. They can build reservoir, plant potatoes, banana, etc. However, the management of forces are not appropriate yet. Obviously, not all of the forces are used.
The fact that enemies burrow within and destroy us must be found. Yet, another problem is that we are not able to cope with this problem, although we have ability to do so. Guidelines on effective implementation and guidelines on effective combat are also not well performed. These must be examined and experience must be drawn.
To review, does it effect the field of guidelines on activities or ideological responsibility of the people? Can our shortcomings be worked out? The main issue lies in the collective leadership. The drought in our country is not as sever as in other countries. Irrigation is also the same case. There must be consecutive farming cycles here, regardless who small the farming is. By doing so, there will be success. In some places, they don't do farming, although water is available. They wait for big farming, which needs too much water that we cannot supply. Instead, if one or two hectare of land is cultivated subsequently, there will be no problem of water. In other places, there is enough water, but transplanted rice seedlings are not enough. It is simply because of deviation from collective leadership.
Some other places try not to save the water, while the water is available. This is a point to transform disadvantage into advantage. This is just an issue of rice farming. The same case applies to diversification of crops.
Therefore, there must be solution based on this guidelines—doing farming, both big, medium and small size. Other crops have to be planted. Each house can have 4-5 clumps of sugarcane, and 3-4 clusters of banana. The possibilities vary according to the size of farmland. By doing this, houses will be surrounded with a variety of crops. It's not hard to do so. It can be divided into two types: cooperative and individual plantation. This will contribute to improving living standard, leading to the extension of our collective.
Why strengthening and extending collective? The answer is to build the country, gain support from foreign friends and to defend the country well.
This requires collective leadership. Sometimes commune and district lack [leadership]. So, they need comments from region, which, in case of need, requires comments from zone.
III. The party's tasks of construction of socialism in all fields
In the past six months, construction of socialism enjoyed much progress in all fields: agriculture, industry, social affairs, health, culture and training and education. Our success is classified as a network of "Great leap forward". Obviously, many unit throughout the country have achieved their plan in this way. However, a few unit haven't done as good. They was so slow.
The unit moving with the speed of great leap forward is the unit responsible for irrigation system. Once we achieve plan of each base, we have to move on to another. We build irrigation system in a strategic way to supply one or two cycles of harvest per year. It is really strategic for cultivation. This is the strong movement in the history of Cambodia. "Strong" here implies the gathering of many forces in just a short term for this year's harvest. This is our good, basic point.
This year's work will determine the 1978's plan. There will be no difficulties. By this current, in 1980 we will have enough water to guarantee two harvest cycles per year. Early this year sees difficulties in the area of water. However, we still can achieve our goal as we have irrigation position. To see its advantages, the irrigation must be protected and extended. In each zone, there are many major dams. The whole country also has such number and quantity. We have never expected that our people can do such a thing in just a short period of time. We build the dams, each of which is as big as or bigger than Baray Toek Thla. We made it only three or four months. That's why our people strongly believe[us].
Besides, there were many other units, including Sre Ambil, some dry season rice paddies, rubber plantations, section for producing water-pump. These sections were moving to some extend with the speed of great leap forward, by achieving the 1977 plan. Some units produced much more than others, while some units achieved the 6-month plan.
Some sections of social affairs [and] culture moved with the speed of great leap. For example, we managed to reduce infectious disease, malaria, by 70 per cent. This is not the result of equipment, rather it is because of our quick mass movement.
Our technical section also enjoy such rapid progress, namely section of electricity, chemistry,.... This leads us to believe that our children are logically able to grasp hold of technical aspect for building the country.
We believe that we will be able to build up economic foundation with independence and self-mastery.
However, in constructing socialism in all fields for this six month, the 3-6 ton per hectare is still problem because self-mastery does not exist yet, and due to objective and subjective factors.
For objective factor, natural phenomenon—drought—has a maximum negative impact not only on our rice this early year, but also on other crops.
Yet, we have to raise our shortcomings for discussion. Obstacles produce experiences. Natural obstacle is a good lesson. Do not take it as a bad lesson and let it go unsettled. If we don't solve this problem, we can not prevail over the movement. National obstacles do not exist only in our country. Other countries have to overcome the same ones, which are even bigger than ours. It affects a series of sections, agriculture, industry....They solve this problem, which appears to be harder. Nature changes a lot. This fact makes us consider this problem as a lesson. Settle the problem of water on time and extend this field until we are in self-mastery.
Initially and strategically we have to settle the problem of water supply.
Second, make good use of the existing water. Take opportunity to get it. Don't just wait and use it when they are sufficiently available.
[Early] this year, we dared not to sow seeds for fear that there would be no water [rain]. So, when water is available now, there are no rice seedlings. It means there was no opportunity for farming. Therefore, to build up socialism as planed, self-mastery in the area of water supply is vital. We must settle this problem in the long run.
This year although there is negative impacts on the plan of 3-6 ton per hectare, we are not hopeless, as it doesn't mean we have no water foundation. Intensive attacks have to be made in all forms, ranging from small, medium to big, and [we must be] ready for the self-mastery by the end of this year. There must be determination on where should long-term rice be cultivated, where to have two time harvest per year, although it appears to have rush period. Start transplanting rice seedlings in January. It is not late to harvest two times in 1978. So, there must be readiness. If we farm mid-term rice, we will harvest two and a half times per year. Thus, it will do. But, it will take two additional months from 1978. It means that 1977 will stretch to 14 months. This is our view on strategic plan. In doing so, seeds and forces have to be prepared. Plan to work in sections, fields, have to be clear. There is no need to prepare these things by the end of each harvest season. There must be preparation in advance. This is a main issue, as it relates to the plan of 3-6 ton per hectare. If it is evident that early in farming season there is no water, we can not let this problem go. Meanwhile, where there is not enough water for rice farming, there must be other choices—planting potatoes, giant gourd, gourd, pumpkin, etc.
Our party prioritizes the movement of achieving the 1977 plan in order to upgrade the quality of the party itself. Of course, there are obstacles, and they will not cease to exist. We, altogether, have to tackle the problems. Guidelines for storming attacks must be set; do whatever needs to be done for reaching the goal of 3-6 tons per hectare.
IV. People's Living Conditions
Generally speaking, in the past six months, our people's living conditions are improved, meaning the party's regiment are implemented. So, it implies that there are active movements for socialist revolution and construction of socialism.
In comparison, it is better than last year. However, referring to the party's assignment to storm attack in farming rainy season rice, there are shortcomings. This fact, on the one hand, may affect the momentum of farming movement, and on the other hand, may affect health to some degree.
How to settle? Solve [the problems] throughout the country, starting from each base. It must be done without fail, for the near future and far future.
Try harder to solve these raised problems. In doing so, there must be force division based on correct guidelines of activities, which are in the following:
1. Strengthen the responsibility for the people's living standards;
2. Organize commanders of all levels in a good manner; and
3. Assign forces in accordance with the correct guidelines of activities: putting aside any unnecessary tasks, while prioritizing issue of food supply.
Therefore, any forces unnecessary must be taken. The whole country consists of not less unnecessary forces. In some places, at this movement of speaking, there are still people clearing up grass in front of their homes. These forces can be used for the transplantation of potatoes. The same applies to other ministries, meaning that crop growing is not really active yet.
[Our] mission statement is "Anything unnecessary is to be taken out." Construction of dikes is to be continued. However, the guidelines of constructing dikes must also be correct. Our request for the time being is just to curb the water. Therefore, there should be a small-scale construction movement. A maximum of force must be saved for supplying rice paddies with water, growing potatoes, banana, and other crops.
Growing of such industrial crops as quinine [and] a plan for producing balm, can be reduced for a period of time.
The issue of dikes, reservoirs shall be implemented in the same way. [Our] request is to curb the water for a while. Decoration and cleaning will be done later. A limited number of people shall be reserved for finishing the remaining works to be done and for their preservation. Most of the forces have to be sent to production areas, such as growing potatoes, pumpkins, giant gourds, gourds, etc. The rest will be well prepared for plowing, so that we can be in self-mastery and in good position of intensive farming when water is available. Therefore, there must be inspection of each ministry, work site, [and] cooperative. Any usable forces in these respective units have to be taken for food production. Don't use too much forces at a place.
Construction of canals, dikes, [and] reservoirs shall be processed at an ordinary speed, while final decoration shall be suspended. This will waste time for this rainy season rice farming. Work intensively on the growing of crops: potatoes, banana and pumpkins, in addition to rice farming. Weaving tasks also need less speed. Weaving scarves will be okay. But, weaving burlap must be suspended, as we still have some. If elderly men and women jointly grow crops, there will be not less outcomes.
Thus, there are leading committee and organization of forces. These kinds of things must not be promulgated as circular; [We] must go down to the base directly.
By doing so, there will be settlement, as our situation is not so worse that it can not be worked out. [One of] our mission statement is to storm attack with people's war. By this way, our people as well cadres can draw on this experience. Main stand for resolution is self-support. All of party's forces, people, and revolutionary army must be boiling and very brave. First there will be obstacles to be overcome. Yet, after that there will be a large quantity of crops existing everywhere.
Self-experiment stems from self-conditioning. If we just wait for food [without any action], there will be no experience. The same applies to the whole country and each grass root.
To suit the real situation now, [we] must not do only long-term rice farming alone. There should be farming of mid-term rice for eating, while doing long-term rice for exportation. It takes twelve months to have the long-term rice harvested.
V. Situation of the party's leadership
In the last six months, our party had overcome intensive attacks in all fields: military, the rear, farming, social and cultural affairs, ministries, offices, etc. These movements make the party condition [itself] to much extend. Moreover, the revolutionary movement enables our party to distinguish two aspects:
- First, it shows the trail of traiitors burrowing within the party for many years. Destructive elements, no-good element, who do not belong to any running dogs but affect the revolution, also abort as a result of our six-month movement. The movement itself is under the process of screening. Based on [our] observation and experience, such elements will continue to exist.
- Second, however, the party enjoyss another degree of quality in the first semester of 1977. By screening traitorous elements and bad elements, the party enjoys relief from pain of abscess [and] venom. Our party is very healthy. Good party candidates and cadres upgrades the political, ideological and organizational quality. Experiences for the movement are also gained. When seeing enemies as network and seeing activities of each network, there must be chains of activities and organization. This is for combat. Many vigorous struggle on several battles bring us so much experiences and quality of the party's leadership at all levels, in terms of political, ideological and organizational quality. The whole country makes such a progress. We implement the party's guidelines based on the forces of the masses and as a result good resolution is shown. Zone, region, district [and] base enjoy the same quality.
In the field of defense, much more improvement is made. Before there were complicated issues, when enemies burrowed to destroy and deviate the party's guidelines. While we are going to do this, they intend to do that, by destroying us subsequently.
By working this out, our party is stronger, and in the process of strengthening and extending.
What experiences result from the six-month combat of construction of party's leadership?
1. It makes us more interested in the class guidelines of the party in organizational field. The six-month experience shows even clearer that local class [grassroots] are more steady than middle and upper classes. Middle class are less steady than local class. Up do now, in all party branches, the local class are at their geographical position, meaning that they don't abandon their place. Most of middle class become enemy networks burrowing within [their place], make thing more complicated, opposed to the party and the people, and prevent the movement [from progress], intentionally or unintentionally.
Therefore, from now on, there must be better implementation of the party's guidelines. The party always raises the issue of class guidelines. Obviously, in the rank of leadership, local class increase in number. The base itself also enjoys leadership role. However, this is not enough. The future needs more extension of the local class. The base- class ensure classness, class standpoint of the party's workers, and overcome several movements with obstacles, both subjective and objective, meaning that they do not overcome with complicated issues one after another.
Local class must be allowed to extend themselves in the leadership rank. They are needed, as they are better guarantors of the party's policy than the party's ideological and organizational fields.
Ideological field and standpoint are different in the party, although [they are] with the movement subsequently. Local class have their trend toward local class themselves, rather than middle class. Thus, three must be much more communications among the local class. As for the middle class, in the face of party's consecutive education, indoctrination of sentiment toward local class, they are still not stronger than the base- class.
So, it is clear whether which class are more steady. The petty bourgeois and poor farmers enjoy their respective improvement. But, there must be strong [stand.] If not so, the petty bourgeois will conquer. This is class struggle inside the party. However, the class struggle must be based on natural sentiment and stand of every individual.
If the local class hold core position, there will be much guarantee. With the local class difficult and favorable circumstances are nothing different. Their fighting with enemies are more absolute, while production movement of them are also more absolute. This make us understand further, for the sake of unity. However, the local class used to work with non-local class, who did not experience with this movement.
2. In the first half of 1977, we manage to sweep clean networking enemies burrowing within. Drawing from such experience, [we] do not just see movement; [their] biographies are also our target. Who contact who, with introduction from who. [By this way] we know [their] circles, sources, where we can conduct [our] search. Thus, biographies must be examined thoroughly and consecutively. Once [their] biographies are in a firm grasp, we will be confident in the quality of our cadres and party candidates.
With the scope of our revolutionary tasks, our party candidates have many shortcomings, although the quality of our party increases.
How to settle this problem? What strategic ways to be found out?
Based on the [current] situation of our party, a part drops from the movement, while another part is moving forward. Some are moving very fast, while some other moving with medium speed. These kinds of [people] must be conditioned as "new" cadres. "New" here implies "new" charge [and] new duty. Therefore, in the whole party, from the top to branches, there must be selection of the current cadres according to their qualifications. For example, in the branches of district, region, zone or in the army, more work must be increased if our cadres improve in terms of quality. This is one of [our] strategies. This involves not only organizational field, but also ideological field—clean-cut standpoint.
Another way to solve the problem is to recruit new party candidates, as we have outlined. What are the possibilities of recruiting new party candidates so far? There are two aspects.
1. Difficult aspects for extension: Certain core organizations receive negative impact from burrowing enemy. For this case, we do not recruit yet. But it is better for recruitment of core organization to start from the masses. This way yields better result than recruitment from core organization to the party.
2. Wherever there are control of correct party organizations, there must be attention on the extension, as sources of the previous recruitment are not bad. If so, we have some possibilities of extending our party candidates. However, there must be more thorough examination. Extension should be made, that is to recruit the masses to join the core organizations as they are new forces without entanglement in enemy activities or no-good elements.
VI. Mission statement for 1977
The mission statement for 1977 is "Storming constant attacks with the great movement of the masses at the speed of great leap forward."
The basic merits of the statement are in the following:
1. Awareness infiltrates into the party, people, telling them to implement tasks, both big and small, at the speed of great leap forward.
2. Obviously, there are active involvement in all fields. Most of the fields have achieved their goals. This is a real great leap forward, in such fields as building reservoirs, producing salt and agricultural tools, and on the issue of getting rid of malaria, etc.
It shows that the statement raised is the standpoint and guidelines for future operation. There will be need for education and propaganda on this slogan. Posters on this statement shall be made for public awareness.
Yet, shortcomings still exist.
1. The impression on this slogan is still limited. Weak memory still prevails. It is not as strong as a force of fire to push cadres and party candidates to work closely with the masses. It is for this reason that there still some places moving very slow, while other place operating in an ordinary manner. The most impressive example is when we met obstacles— subjective or objective, big or small, there were complicated issues in certain areas. Some places managed to overcome. Some did not.
Obviously, we saw two weaknesses. One was the problem of early rice and the other was food for the people. These two fields did not move with the speed of great leap forward yet. The same weaknesses happened to other fields. For example, the people clothes. There are, of course, cloth, needle, thread, and sawing machines. But in some places there were weaknesses in solving the problems of supplying people with clothes. Crop diversification was still not at the speed of great leap forward—that is making the villages full of crops. Some villages were full with new crops, although water condition is not favorable. Some other villages had had nothing than shelters and the sky. There was no crop. They did not lack forces. Both old and young people were at the rear. There was lack of drinking water for both people and animals. Lack of well, lack of pond. We give examples relating to the putting of the slogan into practice. A portion did with great leap forward, while the other lacked awareness of the slogan in the concrete application in each spearhead.
Why? What experiences we have had on these issues? What are weaknesses?
1. Awareness about the slogan "great leap forward".
2. Our main battles succeeded objectively: water, rice paddy.
Most of sub-battles did not manage to do so.
[They] were not aware of the slogan of great leap forward. That was why the rears rarely achieved the goals set. The weaknesses occurred in the areas of [making] wells for drinking and crop diversification. If the rear does not move at the speed of great leap forward, it may affect the battlefront. [Educational campaign was] done for one time, as the rear failed to follow up.
This is a real experience.
What causes the rear less dynamic?
Management of forces at the rear is not correct yet, due to the following factors:
- Don't know how to manage the forcces.
- There is no core [member].
For instance, some places saw active movement in farming. However, there was no management, no command at the rear, while many forces were free at home. That is the reason.
Thus, there must be organization. Core members are not necessary to be party candidates or core organizations. Good masses, who are engaged in the labor work, can be our [core] members. Among 10 or 20, there can be 3 to be selected as a committee. By this way, there will be good male and female combatants. Of course, there will be no good elements. But, their activities will show their nature. Even children can be considered as core members among their rank. Only this way can we build up party candidates [and] core members, as they are purely from the movement.
By achieving this plan, both the front and the rear will be strong. The front implies rice, while the rear implies vegetation and growing of trees for fruits jack-fruit and mango. They are not for additional beauty to people's shelters, but for the health and living of the people.
THE PARTY'S INSTRUCTION ON A VARIETY OF MAIN ISSUES
IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1977
The party's instruction on a variety of main issues in the second half of 1977 is completely based on the party's political assignments for 1977, additional to the party's instruction in April 1977.
This instruction requests promotion of implementation of 1977 plan assigned by the party toward a hundred success or more in the second half of 1977.
The main issues are in the following:
I. Paying more attention to the extension of the party's leadership
In the first half of 1977, the party experienced the following situations:
Certain elements inside the party, from the top to the bottom, fell from the great revolutionary movement of the masses. They were all strips of enemies agents, burrowing within our party for a long time. Meanwhile, were destructive elements against our party, revolution and the people, acting in higher and lower ranks.
Many party candidates were absolute. They did not fall into the said categories. In stead, they upgraded the quality of their revolution in political, ideological and organizational fields. They are qualified to fulfil the party's tasks.
This is our improvement and great success. On the one hand, we basically managed to eliminate enemies burrowing within the party. On the other hand we managed to purify and make the party active.
However, through the experience, our party are well aware that the enemies still exist. If we let them stay further, they will be able to extend their networks in the position of class enemies, enemies of the revolution and enemies of our nation. Therefore, our party resolves to continue to heighten the revolutionary vigilance and gather force in the whole party, along with revolutionary army and cooperative workers in order to hunt them down. By doing so, our party will be purer and may be purest. There will be neither old nor new enemies of this kind. Such measures must be taken deeply and constantly for our party to be more active in its leadership role in the revolutionary movement of all fields. Our slogans are: "Clean party means strong party, strong revolutionary movement." "Clean party center means strong leadership of revolutionary movement in the whole country." "Clean party branch of zone means strong party branch of the zone, and strong revolutionary movement at village level"...etc.
These slogan makes us examine and decide whether our revolutionary movement is strong or not. The only factor which determines the strength and weakness is the leadership of the party either throughout the country or the party at base level, big and small. In other words, in order for the party to be strong, the party must be clean first. (Clean in terms of political, ideological and organizational standpoints). For the party to be clean, there must be no enemy elements inside the party, who are against and destroy the party. In order for the party to be clean there must be one single political line, single ideological and organizational line. Such criteria as activity and active combat in the party single line are also qualified.
In view of the situation where there are shortages of cadres and party candidates, in comparison to the great revolutionary movement, huge and deep, at the present and for the future, the party decides that the party must be absolutely strengthened on time, by on the one hand, paying attention to the strengthening and extending this area among base forces of the party: that is to recruit party candidates, core organizations and progressive masses, who are nurseries of base sources, providing cadres outside of the party and inside of our party. The following steps should be followed:
1. Cadres of all levels, from the top to the district, army, ministry, office, must be strengthened and recruited more. Good elements must be recruited in a timely manner, either one or two, in order to increase leadership forces at each level. "Good [elements]" here is referred to basic classness of those who have experienced consecutive revolutionary movements, grasped hold of and practiced the political, ideological and organizational lines, especially those who have overcome obstacles, small and big. "Good" in terms of morality of living. "Good" in terms of clear biography easy for examination from start to finish. Once we have recruited new forces at each party branch subsequently, the leading forces will increase remarkably, in terms of quantity and quality.
2. Pay attention to recruitment among the revolutionary movement of the masses.
- Progressive masses of local class. Reecruit them and give them clear assignments, either in cooperative, factory, office, ministry, or military.
For example, in cooperative, [we] have to put them at the spearhead of fertilizer, taking care of cattle, growing crops, vegetation, warehouse, barn, plowing tools, ranks, knife, axe, and other agricultural tools, plowing, sowing rice, irrigation, medical field, children, baby, hygiene, etc. Train them in the way that they can try and work at the same time. In the course of learning and working, they should be selected as core members on after another. They must be strengthened. [If] the selected core members are from outside of the party, they must certify at [our] present, especially claim to serve for a long, strategic term.
- Based on the core members, who are prrogressive masses, there must be selection of good elements in order to extend our core organizations (Yuvakk and Backbone). These core organizations come basically from good sources, classness and revolutionary movement.
- Based on the strengthened and extendeed core organizations, there must be attention to recruiting new candidates, and they must be selected the soonest through the above structure.
Our request is that from now up to mid-1978 or end of 1978, leading forces must be strong. Their number must be increased (from the central to district, base, army and leaders in ministry). Only by this way can we push the revolutionary movement of 1977-78 toward healthy situation of 1979.
In the meantime, we also must pay attention to build up forces of second category (progressive masses, core organization, and new party candidates). Make them active so that they can extend themselves on time. And in mid-1978 or by 1979, our cooperatives, factories, and army throughout the country will mostly be sharp and have basic forces worth of quality and quantity. With forces of such quantity, by mid-1978 or by the end of 1979 the base forces in combination with forces from the higher level can produce a strong leadership for our revolutionary movement from the end of 1978 or early in 1979 onward.
PRINCIPLES OF FORCE BUILDING
1. [We] must follow the party's organizational principles and extend [forces] as many as possible and subsequently.
2. Must pay attention to extend force as many as possible wherever clean, belonging to no enemies.
3. Pay attention to good elements, without any involvement with enemies.
4. Establish precisely those components, cadres or individuals, who are responsible for such extension, both at zone, region, district, army, or ministry levels, in order to guarantee the quality of the groups in charge of this task. Do not just introduce generally, to avoid the existence of either burrowing enemies or no-good elements, who may be able to extend new forces with their directions.
II. Paying attention to the continuation of attacking external enemies and
enemies burrowing inside the revolution, so as to eradicate them.
Our party see clearly our success in the elimination of external and internal enemies in the first half of 1977. This is considered as a historic victory following the one gain on April 17 [1975].
At the same time, however, our party is well aware that both external and internal enemies are still striving to fight against our revolution. This is the nature of contradictions between revolution and anti-revolution, between people and oppressing class, between worker class and capitalists, between collectivism and privatization, between socialism and capitalism, between real Marxism-Lenism and anti-revolutionary revisionists, between self-reliance and aggression-ism, expansionism, colonialism, imperialism, etc. This kind of antagonism exists permanently in the international arena, particularly in our society, while opponent class exist in the world as well as in our society.
Therefore, our party resolves that the whole party, the whole army and the whole population must go on with both external and internal enemies, drawing on the experiences and in compliance with the party principles and slogans of "isolation of enemies". By doing so, [we] can gather forces as many as possible, by strategy number 1, strategy number 2, technique number 1, technique number 2, do whatsoever until the enemies are separated and going to vanish from the international arena one after another.
The request for the second half of 1977 is to pay attention to sweeping cleanly away enemies in bases, especially in cooperatives.
III. Starting the storming attacks to achieve the plan of 3-6 tons per hectare
for the second half of 1977.
Based on our basic preparation in combination with the active combat in the first half of 1977, we must encourage the involvement of reaching the goal of 3-6 tons per hectare without fail. To reach this goal, the following issues must be notified:
First is to strengthen and extend the qualification in terms of materials, that is, being self-mastery in water, fertilizer, seeds, fertile soil, farming techniques (sowing, transplanting, plowing, raking, preparing farmland, irrigation, labor force of people, and labor force of animal...etc.
Second is the party's storming attacks. This is a key issue. Continuation must be made to strengthen and extend, and improve commanders on each battle. Go on with political, ideological, and organizational works. Grasp hold of situations of all field, especially the issue of water so that active involvement may happen in small, medium, and large scale: farming mid-term rice, long term rice, and growing other secondary crops. Improve guidelines on effective activities in all fields, such as the use of water, organization of forces for taking care of transplanted rice, sowing and pulling seedlings. These works must be organized according to real circumstances, notably the use of machinery, in order that by the end of this year, these works are done on time and in self-reliance. Sowing, transplanting, and harvesting must be followed one another in order not to waste time.
To simply put, it requires that commanders be strong in all fields so that 3-6 tons per hectare will be achieved from now up to December 1977, but in some places where there are objective obstacles, February 1978.
Our party determines that the rear base must have good management of forces for diversification of crops according to their reasons, (i.e. corn, potatoes), strategic trees for fruits, etc. Commanders of the rear base must be organized with instructions from core members on a daily, ten-day and monthly basis, so as to make the slogans work. "The rear base and the front must work together to achieve the party's 3-6 tons per hectare." "The rear base is the backbone of the front."
IV. Striving to solve and improve the people's living standards as rationed
by the party.
Based on the party's ration, the whole party, especially cadres who are responsible for important tasks at all levels, together with our army and people, must endeavor to solve the people's problems of living, to guarantee their health, particularly in three these three consecutive months—July, August, and September. Any places where are qualified must go ahead to achieve the party's plan, while those places where there are weaknesses, must seek alternative solutions to fulfil the plan. For any places where meet too many weaknesses, experiences of 1976 will be their lessons for encouraging the involvement of settling food problems as hard as they can, based on the standpoint of self-mastery, self-reliance, more importantly in order to build and spread the in-depth standpoint of self-mastery and self-reliance among [people in] the bases, army, and the party. This is a deep political and ideological essence, which is a brilliant capital for our progress toward self-mastery and self-reliance. The way to tackle the problem of people living is to push [people] into growing secondary, strategic crops, including sweet potatoes, potatoes, bean, vegetables, water grass, corn, banana, sugarcane, papaya,...etc. By growing such crops, the problem can be settled for the time being and for the future. Meanwhile, there must attention to the issue of rice, which will yield in the near future. The issue of sugar is also to be solved to improve some degree of people's living standard. Besides, there must be mutual support within the framework of district, region, zone, and the whole country in case of shortages of possibilities of solutions.
The party's request is that from the next year dry season, the eating ration must be guaranteed during the whole year. Technical preparation should be made for the purpose of a three-meal ration: breakfast with potatoes, porridge or other foods, plus main lunch and dinner. This plan is to be implemented from 1978. Therefore, the plans of rice production and crop diversification must be achieved in the rear base. Preparation of forces, cooking pots, firewood, is also the must.
Besides food, attention must be paid to the maximum settlement of people's living in other aspects. Improve their living standards, health, hygiene, shelter, clothing, mosquito net, mate, blanket, cooking pots, rice plate, drinking water (wells, small ponds must be made as many as possible in cooperatives).
Our party sees clearly the improvement of our revolutionary movement of Kampuchea, both in the fields of defense of the country, protection of the revolutionary authority, workers and farmers, continuation of socialist revolution, construction of socialism, promulgation of the influence of Kampuchean revolution in the international arena, subjectivity and objectivity. Thus, we are completely convinced that under the leadership of our Communist Party of Kampuchea, with party central, revolutionary army and collective people, being backbone, we must be able to defend the country from now till 1977.
[UNEDITED]
Letter of Honorary Red Flag
From
Communist Party of Kampuchea's Central Committee
To
Male and Female Cadres and all cooperative farmers in the districts of Prasot (Eastern Zone), Kampong Tralach (Western Zone) and Tram Kak (Southwest Zone)
Unofficial translation by Bunsou Sour
Documentation Center of Cambodia
I. Preamble
In order to encourage the active involvement of the masses to achieving the tasks of defending country, continuing and building socialist revolution with the speed of great leap forwards in consecutive years, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, hereby decides that any district with the best qualifications in terms of defending the country, continuing and building the socialist revolution, is entitled to be awarded Honorary Red Flag.
In 1976, when we have just come out of the war, there were shortages of anything. In the face of it, all bases, entities, and ministries upheld the flag of combat, while storming attacks to vigorously fulfil the party's tasks, with the spirit of high devotion. As a result, the political tasks of all fields set for 1976 was achieved with maximum quality, including national defense, protection of our revolutionary outcomes, continuation and building of socialist revolution. Obviously, a concrete foundation was laid for all bases, entities, and ministries to move forward to achieving political tasks of 1977 with great victory in all fields.
In the great revolutionary movement throughout the country in 1976, the party had observed and noted three districts, which can be considered as a role model in the three fields—defense, continuation and construction of socialist revolution.
The three districts are:
1. The district of Prasot, Eastern Zone;
2. The district of Kampong Tralach, Western Zone; and
3. The district of Tram Kak, Southwest Zone.
1. Exemplary fields of production and settlement of problems arising from people's living conditions. The fact is that, these three districts are poor, having farming soil with less quality. Villagers had been living in poor conditions since the old regimes. However, their rice production climaxed as a result of the implementation of the party's 1976 plan. Sufficient seeds were well prepared, problems of people's living were tackled, while much a mount of rice went to the state.
2. Exemplary stand: Independence, self-reliance in fulfilling the tasks of building socialism, in order to achieve the party's plan of three tons per hectare.
3. Exemplary stand of socialist revolution: Good work in this field. Active involvement and deep engagement in class struggle in the whole districts, especially in the party.
4. Exemplary stand of collectivism, devotion, consciousness of broad solidarity, both in the frameworks of district, region, and zone.
In recognition thereof, the CPK's Central Committee, decides to award Honorary Red Flag 1976 to these three districts.
II. Honorary Red Flag Award
Respected and Beloved male and female cadres and all cooperative farmers of the districts of Prasot, Kampong Tralach and Tram Kak:
In 1976, which had just passed by, all of you, both cadres, male and female cadres and cooperative farmers, heightened our spirit of sever struggle with the stand of independence and self-mastery in breaking obstacles of all kinds. Eventually, you all have your jobs well done in the fields of national defense, protection of our revolutionary outcomes, continuation and construction of the socialist revolution. This make the three districts of yours enjoy rapid progress, which is qualified as model of 1976 for the whole country, aiming to provoke a movement committed to achieve the party's 1977 plan with the speed of great leap forwards in all fields.
1. Exemplary fields of production and settlement of problems arising from
people's living conditions. The fact is that these three districts were poor,
having farming soil with less quality. Villagers had been living in poor
conditions since the old regimes. However, their rice production climaxed
as a result of the implementation of the party's 1976 plan. Sufficient seeds
were prepared, problems of people's living were tackled, while much a
mount of rice went to the state.
2. Exemplary stand: Independence, self-reliance in fulfilling the tasks of building socialism, in order to achieve the party's plan of three tons per hectare.
3. Exemplary stand of socialist revolution: Good work in this field. Active involvement and deep engagement in class struggle in the whole districts, especially in the party.
4. Exemplary stand of collectivism, devotion, consciousness of broad solidarity, both in the frameworks of district, region, and zone.
This is a prominent victory of your comrades. Also, it is the prominent victory for our people as a whole, our army, our revolution and our party.
This is a significant contribution to the promotion of country defense, socialist revolutionary movement and construction of the socialist revolution, settlement of problems arising from the people's living.
Therefore, the CPK's Central Committee would like to appreciate with revolutionary sentiment—touched and warm—to your cadres, and in recognition thereof, award Honorary Red Flag 1976 to all of you.
Beloved comrades,
Your districts have received the Honorary Red Flag 1976 from the party. This is a great honor for our party, our cooperative workers and farmers of the whole country as well as our army to award your comrades. It does imply that your tasks have been finished by this moment. All beloved comrades have to further extend your exemplary qualifications by:
1. Strengthen and extend the 1976 triumph of yours, by drawing on the past experiences in political, ideological, and organization fields, force distribution, technical work, defense tasks, continuation and construction of socialist revolution, etc.
2. Further strengthen and extend the stand of collectivism, socialism, self-mastery, high spirit of revolutionary responsibility, stand of overcoming obstacles of any sorts, for the sake of more successes. In doing so, there must be firm stand, constant revolutionary politeness, thorough internal solidarity and solidarity with other bases.
3. Model upon the general revolutionary heroism of our people, cooperative workers and farmers. Our army's valiancy is also to be copied. By doing so, your comrades will improve yourselves rapidly in the party's political, ideological and organizational fields for the sake of your beloved comrades' district progress following the plan of 1977 and the years to come.
4. Based on your comrades' basic qualifications, combined with the active engagement, comrades have to achieve the party's 1976 plan of 3-6 tons per hectare without fail. Surplus would also be awarded.
With the warmest and deepest revolutionary sentiment, the CPK's Central Committee would like to wish your comrades consecutive successes in fulfilling the brilliant tasks assigned by the party.
The CPK's Central Committee is strongly convinced that other districts and bases will achieve the party's 1977 plan in all fields, like the districts of Prasot, Kampong Tralach, and Tramkak, and even bring about more improvement. Accept, comrades, our greetings with the warmest revolutionary fraternity.
June 30, 1977
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea
Drawing experiences on the political, ideological and organizational stands in the great revolutionary movement of the first six months of 1977
Requests of this text:
1. The great revolutionary movement under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in the past 6 months met a number of problems, enriching us with even more knowledge of political, ideological and organizational stands in defending the country, protecting the authority of the revolutionary workers and farmers for the continuation and construction of the socialist revolution. We altogether do the best to conduct research and shed more light to the main lessons, which are either principles or guidelines for the future practice.
Draw on the experiences and find more directions to attack enemies for defending the country, protect the revolutionary authority of workers and farmers of the party. Draw on the better experiences and find directions which motivate the construction of socialism, significantly the implementation of the 1977 plan, in the fields of country building and settlement of people's living problems. We have to find out keys to them so that more storming attacks would be launched.
We have to be clear on the issues of leadership. Leadership in the party, in all bases—from the highest to the lowest levels.
2. In order to be well prepared for the ultimate attacks in the second half of 1977, leading to a complete achievement of the 1977 plan in all fields.
Therefore, to reach this goal, we raise a variety of issues, which have already been done in 1977, for examination:
We draw on:
1. Tasks of defending the country, [and] revolutionary authority of workers and farmers of the party.
2. Tasks of making socialist revolution.
3. Tasks of building socialism, achieving 3-6 tons per hectare.
I. Tasks of defending the country of Democratic Kampuchea, protecting the revolutionary outcomes, the revolutionary authority, the party, the classes, people and the revolution army of Kampuchea.
1. Country defense—External Affairs.
As far as the country defense is concerned, in general, we are in complete control and self-mastery of all boundaries: land boundary [and] territorial water, sharing borders with other foreign countries.
The main reasons that our collective people and revolutionary army achieved this work:
- [They] have implemented correctlyy and thoroughly according to the party's political lines on country defense.
- [They] have had stand of high revvolutionary vigilance toward the enemies.
- [They] have had correct line of aactivities in the field of defending the country.
In the country defense movement, i.e. external affairs, we perform correctly and thoroughly according to the party's country defense political lines. The following are our experiences of political and ideological stand:
- Our party, people, and revolutionary armyy, know even more clearly the image of the enemies—without any confusion and dubiety. Our stand of limiting friend-and-enemy is strengthened among our party, people, and revolutionary army by the way the enemies committed against us: aggression, expansion, shelling, strafing, espionage, sabotage, stealing of cattle, annexation of land for cultivation along the border areas.
Based on the vivid definition, we enjoy even more active wrath-abetting movement towards enemies of our nation, people, revolution, worker-class, collective socialism, and of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. At the same time, stand of patriotic consciousness, loving people, loving the revolution, loving the worker class, loving the collective socialism and the loving party are strengthened.
- [We] become increasingly aware off and adhere to the stand of high responsibility in the area of defense of the Democratic Kampuchea.
- Moreover, going through the counttry defense movement, certain negative stands are abolished: middle-of-the-road stand, country defense in an inactive manner, country construction-ism, seeing no antagonism with the enemies of our nation.
To sum up, our party, people, and revolutionary army manage to defend the country with complete self-mastery, based on the party's correct stand and guidelines on country defense.
2. Defending the country, the revolutionary authority of workers and farmers within the country.
1. Country defense among the people:
The country defense among the people are moving on track because of good awareness and implementation of solidarity guideline, [and] outstanding gathering of party's forces. More significantly, poor worker and peasant class and middle class farmers are stronger and extended, becoming a solid foundation for the socialist revolutionary movement.
[We must] carry out indoctrination on the political and ideological guidelines among the people, especially those in the local bases. There appears to be more active in terms of this area. Selection, strengthening and extending of organizations are smoothly implemented, making the components among the people become purer.
Meanwhile, [we] settle the problems of people's living step by step, making the people increase their belief in the party, the revolution and revolutionary army.
Drawing on our experience, if revolutionary authority in local bases is settled properly, i.e., if cooperative is strengthened positively and carefully screened, a maximum of people safeguard will be warranted.
2. Defense inside the party and in our rank
Situation of defense inside the party and in our rank is much better than before—in terms of both quantity and quality. Obviously, we have screened the party—from the top to the bottom. Basically, many bases have already been settled, except some which remains to be done later.
The screening of networks of enemies burrowing inside improves the quality of the party, revolutionary army, male and female combatants as well as the quality of a majority of the people, who know the antagonism between us and enemies and other experiences in eliminating burrowing enemies and attacking enemies.
Needless to say, the quality of our party increases, both in political, ideological, and consciousness areas. These experiences should be further acquired from within our party, revolutionary army and people in order to wove into a net for defeating and dealing with burrowing enemies.
However, enemies burrowing inside do not cease to exist yet. The old enemy networks of all sorts are not completely removed. A few remains in bases, entities, offices or ministries.
How can we settle the problems?
1. [We] must hold a clear stand and view that we haven't yet cleaned burrowing enemies a hundred percent. The remainders enjoy extending themselves.
2. [We] must take absolute measure in zero-tolerance manner and without hesitation.
The procedure of eliminating enemies burrowing from within expires four months already. Please be reminded:
1. Encourage and educate the masses in the party, core organizations, revolutionary army and among the people so that they are clearly aware of how the burrowing enemies act. By this way, they will become forces in search of enemies and attacking enemies. The same applies to each ministry, base, and army. We move step by step. Wherever measures (of eliminating enemies) are available, there must be encouragement and education for the masses so that they become forces in search of enemies and eliminating enemies.
2. Essence for searching for the burrowing enemies must be the one of the party's political, ideological and organizational guidelines. Check them up to make sure they are correct. In this context, what is to be taken as a core? The answer is the party. Obviously, party center is the core for the whole country. The same applies to zone, region, district, office, ministry. Each spearhead has to have its core [forces] in sweeping burrowing enemies away.
CERTAIN EXPEREINCES IN ADDITION TO OURS FROM APRIL 1977.
1.To be in self-mastery in advance and to take measure on the right time, there must be a clear view toward the constant antagonism, while holding a clear view that enemies of all strips have their running-dog agents burrowing within ourselves. Hold this stand in advance, while having the spirit of high revolutionary vigilance. And keep track of any small phenomenon.
2. In order to keep an eye on and search for enemies, [we] must base on our the positive biography, both in a prior and post revolutionary period. It must consist of personal, social and commercial background. Among others, the date of entry into the revolution and name of introducers must be included. We used to work in this field with less attention. This really affected our party's principles, making the enemies burrowing within [our party] increased in number. We didn't expect that we paid such less attention. We held subjective view. Some elements came closer to hold important positions. These individuals have had connections since 1955. Generally speaking, [they have been] with the movement for a long time. Yet, we were morally lax in grasping hold of their histories. We didn't know their circles before their entry into the revolution.
3. In order to make sure whether they are bad or good elements, enemies or non-enemies, there must be examination of application of the party's guidelines. How they practice the party's political guidelines? How are their political, ideological and organizational realities? How their implementation of country defense guidelines? How do they work in terms of socialist revolution [and] construction of the socialism. Left[ism] is wrong; right[ism] is wrong. One, two, or many leftist activities or systematic rightist activities cause a problem. Where complicated problems occur consecutively which can not be solved, that is problem. Consecutively practicing socialist revolution with leftism and rightism is problem. Moral laxness in practicing the guidelines of the construction of socialism is problem. Failing to solve the problem of people's living on a constant basis is problem. Our experiences show:
- In certain zones, traitorous elemments burrowed from within and implemented systematic political, ideological and organizational activities in the wrong ways. They were morally wrong in the systematic manner. Shortcomings occurred one after another.
- There were always disputes among districts, which share the borders with each other. We knew that there had to be enemies, who, by our assumption, were new evacuees.
From the above experiences, we assume that both the country defense, socialist revolution, and construction of socialism must be based on political position, fighting the enemies until gaining victory. If we could not attack enemies burrowing inside, it does not make sense to win victory in the field of country defense, socialist revolution [and] construction of socialism. Only getting rid of enemies burrowing inside from small and big organizations, do it means that we can implement the party's guidelines. Real example from 1976 is evident. Therefore, we must basically rely on the fight against enemies in order to defend the country, make the socialist revolution and build socialism. Our masses must be aware of this issue. We must constantly fight the enemies. Fight and then substitute our core [agents]. Masses can also be our core [agents].
4. Problems arising from our activities of attacking enemies. Class issue become even more complicated. Many of traitors are petty bourgeois class. Among which there are a few peasant class, who actually have no nature of peasants. They become fake petty bourgeoisie, whose performance are overwhelmed with joy.
In summary, it appears that enemies find it so easy to lure [people] on the petty bourgeois circle, because such a class enjoy individualism, dogmatism, resentment, [and] have tendency to confession [admission]. Their speech, even a word, is always in fluctuating manner.
Other peasants, in bases or ministries, who are also traitors:
- Some of them have been an enemy aagent for long time ago or elements are by the side of enemies.
- Many others are those who are undder the control of petty bourgeoisie. They don't understand; they can not awake, as the petty bourgeoisie always curb them. The petty bourgeoisie prevent them from enjoying the guidelines, rights, [and] party's statute.
In other words, petty bourgeoisie are a source easy to be convinced by enemies. They take the victorious occasion as a time for over-enjoyment, drinking, in a debauchery manner...
Resentment, in any circumstances, and more or less, makes ways for enemies to carry out their enticement. The problem is the jealousy stemming from position promotion in different times and other contradictions. Taking this opportunity, enemies try to provoke troubles, while petty bourgeoisie are motivating others to feel resentment toward the party.
Worse still, it brings about frustration and complicated situation. It implies that all circumstances in favor of enemies are available. This is an experience. The petty bourgeoisie [of this kind] include those from cities, rural areas, those who give up monkhood, or middle-class peasants or vendor-peasants. Enemies find it harder to entice base people than middle-class. So, we have to stand firmly on the party's guidelines. Before we implemented the party's guidelines. But we were morally lax. From now on we have to practice the party's class guidelines with great quality, tantamount to "great leap forward".
5. Another experience, we have to rely on the masses to attack enemies. In doing so, masses have to be educated about political and ideological areas so that enemies could not be broadened.
For example, we have established a new place [of new elements]. Once we went to that place, we were not able to find all enemies, while enemies were able to carry out their activities to some degree, as the masses were not aware of that. We encouraged the masses. As a result, they found enemies one after another. Therefore, we have to make the masses understand, and the party have to be the backbone of the masses.
Experiences from another place. We made the masses convinced. If they were confident in the ministerial committee(s), they would report to the committees [and] party branches. They did not produce anonymous reports. Yet, they had to be completely responsible for the reports. Experiences tell us that bases also can do this job.
II. Implementation of tasks of the continuation of the party's socialist revolution
We have strengthened and extended our collective socialism. As the collectivism of proletarian class are not to shake and reject, and due to the mass movements under the leadership of the party, on the one hand we manage to control situation where we eliminate all oppressing class, which are becoming faint gradually. On the other hand, all private regimes can not raise their heads. They are under the control of the mass movement, who are going deeper. The tools of the oppressing class, namely currency, market, etc., can not be returned. The mass movement are in the process of curbing it. This is a phenomenon, indicating our victory in the continuation of the socialist revolution. Enemies of all strips are not able to re-exist. Instead, they are on the way to a complete collapse.
In this situation, we continue to storm attacks to sweep enemies away. Defeat and attack such enemies as international agents, enemies burrowing inside, class enemies to a degree that they could not make any reaction, even a little.
Another advantage is spirit of consciousness inside the party, the army, poor peasants and lower middle-class farmers and middle-class farmers. They are satisfied with the socialist revolution. This is the consciousness of political and ideological areas.
In the last six month, our people worked vigorously with revolutionary optimism. This is recognized by the way they:
1. have enough to eat, good health and are satisfied with the collectivism. Moreover, they are enjoying better shelters and medicines for the safeguards of themselves as well as their children. During the post-war period, our brothers and sisters see outcomes themselves. That's why the revolutionary movement in the field of country construction become very active with revolutionary optimism. They are content to have reservoirs, dams [and] canals. They witness the accomplishments of themselves and of the poor farmers and middle-class farmers. They are contented and feel proud. Most of them are absolute. Poor farmers, lower middle-class farmers and middle-class farmers general farmers, and even petty landlords who had suffered the war of aggression are also happy. New components following April 17, [1975] also accept this regime.
In total, 95 per cent acknowledge the collectivism of the party's proletarian class.
At the same time, shortcomings still occur. People and [those] in the [revolutionary] rank lack awareness of the brilliant collectivism. The reasons are:
1. our party has not encourages the involvement of the local masses; and
2. the enemies in the rank deviate and indoctrinate wrong concept.
From now on, the revolutionary army, male and female combatants, young and old, must be educated from the top to the bottom. Their level for education have to be classified. Education at lower level must be deeper. In case of mixed components, there must be stretch-out education.
Dig up people forces for their potential engagement along with political and ideological indoctrination. Just a meeting a lone will not do. Indoctrination must be the must.
Our second shortcoming is that food ration of our people in this raining season is reduced a little bit. It makes people feel upset to some degree. Of course, we have to solve this problem. It must be done as our collectivism is fantastic. Our mobile units can be moved to anywhere. They can build reservoir, plant potatoes, banana, etc. However, the management of forces are not appropriate yet. Obviously, not all of the forces are used.
The fact that enemies burrow within and destroy us must be found. Yet, another problem is that we are not able to cope with this problem, although we have ability to do so. Guidelines on effective implementation and guidelines on effective combat are also not well performed. These must be examined and experience must be drawn.
To review, does it effect the field of guidelines on activities or ideological responsibility of the people? Can our shortcomings be worked out? The main issue lies in the collective leadership. The drought in our country is not as sever as in other countries. Irrigation is also the same case. There must be consecutive farming cycles here, regardless who small the farming is. By doing so, there will be success. In some places, they don't do farming, although water is available. They wait for big farming, which needs too much water that we cannot supply. Instead, if one or two hectare of land is cultivated subsequently, there will be no problem of water. In other places, there is enough water, but transplanted rice seedlings are not enough. It is simply because of deviation from collective leadership.
Some other places try not to save the water, while the water is available. This is a point to transform disadvantage into advantage. This is just an issue of rice farming. The same case applies to diversification of crops.
Therefore, there must be solution based on this guidelines—doing farming, both big, medium and small size. Other crops have to be planted. Each house can have 4-5 clumps of sugarcane, and 3-4 clusters of banana. The possibilities vary according to the size of farmland. By doing this, houses will be surrounded with a variety of crops. It's not hard to do so. It can be divided into two types: cooperative and individual plantation. This will contribute to improving living standard, leading to the extension of our collective.
Why strengthening and extending collective? The answer is to build the country, gain support from foreign friends and to defend the country well.
This requires collective leadership. Sometimes commune and district lack [leadership]. So, they need comments from region, which, in case of need, requires comments from zone.
III. The party's tasks of construction of socialism in all fields
In the past six months, construction of socialism enjoyed much progress in all fields: agriculture, industry, social affairs, health, culture and training and education. Our success is classified as a network of "Great leap forward". Obviously, many unit throughout the country have achieved their plan in this way. However, a few unit haven't done as good. They was so slow.
The unit moving with the speed of great leap forward is the unit responsible for irrigation system. Once we achieve plan of each base, we have to move on to another. We build irrigation system in a strategic way to supply one or two cycles of harvest per year. It is really strategic for cultivation. This is the strong movement in the history of Cambodia. "Strong" here implies the gathering of many forces in just a short term for this year's harvest. This is our good, basic point.
This year's work will determine the 1978's plan. There will be no difficulties. By this current, in 1980 we will have enough water to guarantee two harvest cycles per year. Early this year sees difficulties in the area of water. However, we still can achieve our goal as we have irrigation position. To see its advantages, the irrigation must be protected and extended. In each zone, there are many major dams. The whole country also has such number and quantity. We have never expected that our people can do such a thing in just a short period of time. We build the dams, each of which is as big as or bigger than Baray Toek Thla. We made it only three or four months. That's why our people strongly believe[us].
Besides, there were many other units, including Sre Ambil, some dry season rice paddies, rubber plantations, section for producing water-pump. These sections were moving to some extend with the speed of great leap forward, by achieving the 1977 plan. Some units produced much more than others, while some units achieved the 6-month plan.
Some sections of social affairs [and] culture moved with the speed of great leap. For example, we managed to reduce infectious disease, malaria, by 70 per cent. This is not the result of equipment, rather it is because of our quick mass movement.
Our technical section also enjoy such rapid progress, namely section of electricity, chemistry,.... This leads us to believe that our children are logically able to grasp hold of technical aspect for building the country.
We believe that we will be able to build up economic foundation with independence and self-mastery.
However, in constructing socialism in all fields for this six month, the 3-6 ton per hectare is still problem because self-mastery does not exist yet, and due to objective and subjective factors.
For objective factor, natural phenomenon—drought—has a maximum negative impact not only on our rice this early year, but also on other crops.
Yet, we have to raise our shortcomings for discussion. Obstacles produce experiences. Natural obstacle is a good lesson. Do not take it as a bad lesson and let it go unsettled. If we don't solve this problem, we can not prevail over the movement. National obstacles do not exist only in our country. Other countries have to overcome the same ones, which are even bigger than ours. It affects a series of sections, agriculture, industry....They solve this problem, which appears to be harder. Nature changes a lot. This fact makes us consider this problem as a lesson. Settle the problem of water on time and extend this field until we are in self-mastery.
Initially and strategically we have to settle the problem of water supply.
Second, make good use of the existing water. Take opportunity to get it. Don't just wait and use it when they are sufficiently available.
[Early] this year, we dared not to sow seeds for fear that there would be no water [rain]. So, when water is available now, there are no rice seedlings. It means there was no opportunity for farming. Therefore, to build up socialism as planed, self-mastery in the area of water supply is vital. We must settle this problem in the long run.
This year although there is negative impacts on the plan of 3-6 ton per hectare, we are not hopeless, as it doesn't mean we have no water foundation. Intensive attacks have to be made in all forms, ranging from small, medium to big, and [we must be] ready for the self-mastery by the end of this year. There must be determination on where should long-term rice be cultivated, where to have two time harvest per year, although it appears to have rush period. Start transplanting rice seedlings in January. It is not late to harvest two times in 1978. So, there must be readiness. If we farm mid-term rice, we will harvest two and a half times per year. Thus, it will do. But, it will take two additional months from 1978. It means that 1977 will stretch to 14 months. This is our view on strategic plan. In doing so, seeds and forces have to be prepared. Plan to work in sections, fields, have to be clear. There is no need to prepare these things by the end of each harvest season. There must be preparation in advance. This is a main issue, as it relates to the plan of 3-6 ton per hectare. If it is evident that early in farming season there is no water, we can not let this problem go. Meanwhile, where there is not enough water for rice farming, there must be other choices—planting potatoes, giant gourd, gourd, pumpkin, etc.
Our party prioritizes the movement of achieving the 1977 plan in order to upgrade the quality of the party itself. Of course, there are obstacles, and they will not cease to exist. We, altogether, have to tackle the problems. Guidelines for storming attacks must be set; do whatever needs to be done for reaching the goal of 3-6 tons per hectare.
IV. People's Living Conditions
Generally speaking, in the past six months, our people's living conditions are improved, meaning the party's regiment are implemented. So, it implies that there are active movements for socialist revolution and construction of socialism.
In comparison, it is better than last year. However, referring to the party's assignment to storm attack in farming rainy season rice, there are shortcomings. This fact, on the one hand, may affect the momentum of farming movement, and on the other hand, may affect health to some degree.
How to settle? Solve [the problems] throughout the country, starting from each base. It must be done without fail, for the near future and far future.
Try harder to solve these raised problems. In doing so, there must be force division based on correct guidelines of activities, which are in the following:
1. Strengthen the responsibility for the people's living standards;
2. Organize commanders of all levels in a good manner; and
3. Assign forces in accordance with the correct guidelines of activities: putting aside any unnecessary tasks, while prioritizing issue of food supply.
Therefore, any forces unnecessary must be taken. The whole country consists of not less unnecessary forces. In some places, at this movement of speaking, there are still people clearing up grass in front of their homes. These forces can be used for the transplantation of potatoes. The same applies to other ministries, meaning that crop growing is not really active yet.
[Our] mission statement is "Anything unnecessary is to be taken out." Construction of dikes is to be continued. However, the guidelines of constructing dikes must also be correct. Our request for the time being is just to curb the water. Therefore, there should be a small-scale construction movement. A maximum of force must be saved for supplying rice paddies with water, growing potatoes, banana, and other crops.
Growing of such industrial crops as quinine [and] a plan for producing balm, can be reduced for a period of time.
The issue of dikes, reservoirs shall be implemented in the same way. [Our] request is to curb the water for a while. Decoration and cleaning will be done later. A limited number of people shall be reserved for finishing the remaining works to be done and for their preservation. Most of the forces have to be sent to production areas, such as growing potatoes, pumpkins, giant gourds, gourds, etc. The rest will be well prepared for plowing, so that we can be in self-mastery and in good position of intensive farming when water is available. Therefore, there must be inspection of each ministry, work site, [and] cooperative. Any usable forces in these respective units have to be taken for food production. Don't use too much forces at a place.
Construction of canals, dikes, [and] reservoirs shall be processed at an ordinary speed, while final decoration shall be suspended. This will waste time for this rainy season rice farming. Work intensively on the growing of crops: potatoes, banana and pumpkins, in addition to rice farming. Weaving tasks also need less speed. Weaving scarves will be okay. But, weaving burlap must be suspended, as we still have some. If elderly men and women jointly grow crops, there will be not less outcomes.
Thus, there are leading committee and organization of forces. These kinds of things must not be promulgated as circular; [We] must go down to the base directly.
By doing so, there will be settlement, as our situation is not so worse that it can not be worked out. [One of] our mission statement is to storm attack with people's war. By this way, our people as well cadres can draw on this experience. Main stand for resolution is self-support. All of party's forces, people, and revolutionary army must be boiling and very brave. First there will be obstacles to be overcome. Yet, after that there will be a large quantity of crops existing everywhere.
Self-experiment stems from self-conditioning. If we just wait for food [without any action], there will be no experience. The same applies to the whole country and each grass root.
To suit the real situation now, [we] must not do only long-term rice farming alone. There should be farming of mid-term rice for eating, while doing long-term rice for exportation. It takes twelve months to have the long-term rice harvested.
V. Situation of the party's leadership
In the last six months, our party had overcome intensive attacks in all fields: military, the rear, farming, social and cultural affairs, ministries, offices, etc. These movements make the party condition [itself] to much extend. Moreover, the revolutionary movement enables our party to distinguish two aspects:
- First, it shows the trail of traiitors burrowing within the party for many years. Destructive elements, no-good element, who do not belong to any running dogs but affect the revolution, also abort as a result of our six-month movement. The movement itself is under the process of screening. Based on [our] observation and experience, such elements will continue to exist.
- Second, however, the party enjoyss another degree of quality in the first semester of 1977. By screening traitorous elements and bad elements, the party enjoys relief from pain of abscess [and] venom. Our party is very healthy. Good party candidates and cadres upgrades the political, ideological and organizational quality. Experiences for the movement are also gained. When seeing enemies as network and seeing activities of each network, there must be chains of activities and organization. This is for combat. Many vigorous struggle on several battles bring us so much experiences and quality of the party's leadership at all levels, in terms of political, ideological and organizational quality. The whole country makes such a progress. We implement the party's guidelines based on the forces of the masses and as a result good resolution is shown. Zone, region, district [and] base enjoy the same quality.
In the field of defense, much more improvement is made. Before there were complicated issues, when enemies burrowed to destroy and deviate the party's guidelines. While we are going to do this, they intend to do that, by destroying us subsequently.
By working this out, our party is stronger, and in the process of strengthening and extending.
What experiences result from the six-month combat of construction of party's leadership?
1. It makes us more interested in the class guidelines of the party in organizational field. The six-month experience shows even clearer that local class [grassroots] are more steady than middle and upper classes. Middle class are less steady than local class. Up do now, in all party branches, the local class are at their geographical position, meaning that they don't abandon their place. Most of middle class become enemy networks burrowing within [their place], make thing more complicated, opposed to the party and the people, and prevent the movement [from progress], intentionally or unintentionally.
Therefore, from now on, there must be better implementation of the party's guidelines. The party always raises the issue of class guidelines. Obviously, in the rank of leadership, local class increase in number. The base itself also enjoys leadership role. However, this is not enough. The future needs more extension of the local class. The base- class ensure classness, class standpoint of the party's workers, and overcome several movements with obstacles, both subjective and objective, meaning that they do not overcome with complicated issues one after another.
Local class must be allowed to extend themselves in the leadership rank. They are needed, as they are better guarantors of the party's policy than the party's ideological and organizational fields.
Ideological field and standpoint are different in the party, although [they are] with the movement subsequently. Local class have their trend toward local class themselves, rather than middle class. Thus, three must be much more communications among the local class. As for the middle class, in the face of party's consecutive education, indoctrination of sentiment toward local class, they are still not stronger than the base- class.
So, it is clear whether which class are more steady. The petty bourgeois and poor farmers enjoy their respective improvement. But, there must be strong [stand.] If not so, the petty bourgeois will conquer. This is class struggle inside the party. However, the class struggle must be based on natural sentiment and stand of every individual.
If the local class hold core position, there will be much guarantee. With the local class difficult and favorable circumstances are nothing different. Their fighting with enemies are more absolute, while production movement of them are also more absolute. This make us understand further, for the sake of unity. However, the local class used to work with non-local class, who did not experience with this movement.
2. In the first half of 1977, we manage to sweep clean networking enemies burrowing within. Drawing from such experience, [we] do not just see movement; [their] biographies are also our target. Who contact who, with introduction from who. [By this way] we know [their] circles, sources, where we can conduct [our] search. Thus, biographies must be examined thoroughly and consecutively. Once [their] biographies are in a firm grasp, we will be confident in the quality of our cadres and party candidates.
With the scope of our revolutionary tasks, our party candidates have many shortcomings, although the quality of our party increases.
How to settle this problem? What strategic ways to be found out?
Based on the [current] situation of our party, a part drops from the movement, while another part is moving forward. Some are moving very fast, while some other moving with medium speed. These kinds of [people] must be conditioned as "new" cadres. "New" here implies "new" charge [and] new duty. Therefore, in the whole party, from the top to branches, there must be selection of the current cadres according to their qualifications. For example, in the branches of district, region, zone or in the army, more work must be increased if our cadres improve in terms of quality. This is one of [our] strategies. This involves not only organizational field, but also ideological field—clean-cut standpoint.
Another way to solve the problem is to recruit new party candidates, as we have outlined. What are the possibilities of recruiting new party candidates so far? There are two aspects.
1. Difficult aspects for extension: Certain core organizations receive negative impact from burrowing enemy. For this case, we do not recruit yet. But it is better for recruitment of core organization to start from the masses. This way yields better result than recruitment from core organization to the party.
2. Wherever there are control of correct party organizations, there must be attention on the extension, as sources of the previous recruitment are not bad. If so, we have some possibilities of extending our party candidates. However, there must be more thorough examination. Extension should be made, that is to recruit the masses to join the core organizations as they are new forces without entanglement in enemy activities or no-good elements.
VI. Mission statement for 1977
The mission statement for 1977 is "Storming constant attacks with the great movement of the masses at the speed of great leap forward."
The basic merits of the statement are in the following:
1. Awareness infiltrates into the party, people, telling them to implement tasks, both big and small, at the speed of great leap forward.
2. Obviously, there are active involvement in all fields. Most of the fields have achieved their goals. This is a real great leap forward, in such fields as building reservoirs, producing salt and agricultural tools, and on the issue of getting rid of malaria, etc.
It shows that the statement raised is the standpoint and guidelines for future operation. There will be need for education and propaganda on this slogan. Posters on this statement shall be made for public awareness.
Yet, shortcomings still exist.
1. The impression on this slogan is still limited. Weak memory still prevails. It is not as strong as a force of fire to push cadres and party candidates to work closely with the masses. It is for this reason that there still some places moving very slow, while other place operating in an ordinary manner. The most impressive example is when we met obstacles— subjective or objective, big or small, there were complicated issues in certain areas. Some places managed to overcome. Some did not.
Obviously, we saw two weaknesses. One was the problem of early rice and the other was food for the people. These two fields did not move with the speed of great leap forward yet. The same weaknesses happened to other fields. For example, the people clothes. There are, of course, cloth, needle, thread, and sawing machines. But in some places there were weaknesses in solving the problems of supplying people with clothes. Crop diversification was still not at the speed of great leap forward—that is making the villages full of crops. Some villages were full with new crops, although water condition is not favorable. Some other villages had had nothing than shelters and the sky. There was no crop. They did not lack forces. Both old and young people were at the rear. There was lack of drinking water for both people and animals. Lack of well, lack of pond. We give examples relating to the putting of the slogan into practice. A portion did with great leap forward, while the other lacked awareness of the slogan in the concrete application in each spearhead.
Why? What experiences we have had on these issues? What are weaknesses?
1. Awareness about the slogan "great leap forward".
2. Our main battles succeeded objectively: water, rice paddy.
Most of sub-battles did not manage to do so.
[They] were not aware of the slogan of great leap forward. That was why the rears rarely achieved the goals set. The weaknesses occurred in the areas of [making] wells for drinking and crop diversification. If the rear does not move at the speed of great leap forward, it may affect the battlefront. [Educational campaign was] done for one time, as the rear failed to follow up.
This is a real experience.
What causes the rear less dynamic?
Management of forces at the rear is not correct yet, due to the following factors:
- Don't know how to manage the forcces.
- There is no core [member].
For instance, some places saw active movement in farming. However, there was no management, no command at the rear, while many forces were free at home. That is the reason.
Thus, there must be organization. Core members are not necessary to be party candidates or core organizations. Good masses, who are engaged in the labor work, can be our [core] members. Among 10 or 20, there can be 3 to be selected as a committee. By this way, there will be good male and female combatants. Of course, there will be no good elements. But, their activities will show their nature. Even children can be considered as core members among their rank. Only this way can we build up party candidates [and] core members, as they are purely from the movement.
By achieving this plan, both the front and the rear will be strong. The front implies rice, while the rear implies vegetation and growing of trees for fruits jack-fruit and mango. They are not for additional beauty to people's shelters, but for the health and living of the people.
THE PARTY'S INSTRUCTION ON A VARIETY OF MAIN ISSUES
IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1977
The party's instruction on a variety of main issues in the second half of 1977 is completely based on the party's political assignments for 1977, additional to the party's instruction in April 1977.
This instruction requests promotion of implementation of 1977 plan assigned by the party toward a hundred success or more in the second half of 1977.
The main issues are in the following:
I. Paying more attention to the extension of the party's leadership
In the first half of 1977, the party experienced the following situations:
Certain elements inside the party, from the top to the bottom, fell from the great revolutionary movement of the masses. They were all strips of enemies agents, burrowing within our party for a long time. Meanwhile, were destructive elements against our party, revolution and the people, acting in higher and lower ranks.
Many party candidates were absolute. They did not fall into the said categories. In stead, they upgraded the quality of their revolution in political, ideological and organizational fields. They are qualified to fulfil the party's tasks.
This is our improvement and great success. On the one hand, we basically managed to eliminate enemies burrowing within the party. On the other hand we managed to purify and make the party active.
However, through the experience, our party are well aware that the enemies still exist. If we let them stay further, they will be able to extend their networks in the position of class enemies, enemies of the revolution and enemies of our nation. Therefore, our party resolves to continue to heighten the revolutionary vigilance and gather force in the whole party, along with revolutionary army and cooperative workers in order to hunt them down. By doing so, our party will be purer and may be purest. There will be neither old nor new enemies of this kind. Such measures must be taken deeply and constantly for our party to be more active in its leadership role in the revolutionary movement of all fields. Our slogans are: "Clean party means strong party, strong revolutionary movement." "Clean party center means strong leadership of revolutionary movement in the whole country." "Clean party branch of zone means strong party branch of the zone, and strong revolutionary movement at village level"...etc.
These slogan makes us examine and decide whether our revolutionary movement is strong or not. The only factor which determines the strength and weakness is the leadership of the party either throughout the country or the party at base level, big and small. In other words, in order for the party to be strong, the party must be clean first. (Clean in terms of political, ideological and organizational standpoints). For the party to be clean, there must be no enemy elements inside the party, who are against and destroy the party. In order for the party to be clean there must be one single political line, single ideological and organizational line. Such criteria as activity and active combat in the party single line are also qualified.
In view of the situation where there are shortages of cadres and party candidates, in comparison to the great revolutionary movement, huge and deep, at the present and for the future, the party decides that the party must be absolutely strengthened on time, by on the one hand, paying attention to the strengthening and extending this area among base forces of the party: that is to recruit party candidates, core organizations and progressive masses, who are nurseries of base sources, providing cadres outside of the party and inside of our party. The following steps should be followed:
1. Cadres of all levels, from the top to the district, army, ministry, office, must be strengthened and recruited more. Good elements must be recruited in a timely manner, either one or two, in order to increase leadership forces at each level. "Good [elements]" here is referred to basic classness of those who have experienced consecutive revolutionary movements, grasped hold of and practiced the political, ideological and organizational lines, especially those who have overcome obstacles, small and big. "Good" in terms of morality of living. "Good" in terms of clear biography easy for examination from start to finish. Once we have recruited new forces at each party branch subsequently, the leading forces will increase remarkably, in terms of quantity and quality.
2. Pay attention to recruitment among the revolutionary movement of the masses.
- Progressive masses of local class. Reecruit them and give them clear assignments, either in cooperative, factory, office, ministry, or military.
For example, in cooperative, [we] have to put them at the spearhead of fertilizer, taking care of cattle, growing crops, vegetation, warehouse, barn, plowing tools, ranks, knife, axe, and other agricultural tools, plowing, sowing rice, irrigation, medical field, children, baby, hygiene, etc. Train them in the way that they can try and work at the same time. In the course of learning and working, they should be selected as core members on after another. They must be strengthened. [If] the selected core members are from outside of the party, they must certify at [our] present, especially claim to serve for a long, strategic term.
- Based on the core members, who are prrogressive masses, there must be selection of good elements in order to extend our core organizations (Yuvakk and Backbone). These core organizations come basically from good sources, classness and revolutionary movement.
- Based on the strengthened and extendeed core organizations, there must be attention to recruiting new candidates, and they must be selected the soonest through the above structure.
Our request is that from now up to mid-1978 or end of 1978, leading forces must be strong. Their number must be increased (from the central to district, base, army and leaders in ministry). Only by this way can we push the revolutionary movement of 1977-78 toward healthy situation of 1979.
In the meantime, we also must pay attention to build up forces of second category (progressive masses, core organization, and new party candidates). Make them active so that they can extend themselves on time. And in mid-1978 or by 1979, our cooperatives, factories, and army throughout the country will mostly be sharp and have basic forces worth of quality and quantity. With forces of such quantity, by mid-1978 or by the end of 1979 the base forces in combination with forces from the higher level can produce a strong leadership for our revolutionary movement from the end of 1978 or early in 1979 onward.
PRINCIPLES OF FORCE BUILDING
1. [We] must follow the party's organizational principles and extend [forces] as many as possible and subsequently.
2. Must pay attention to extend force as many as possible wherever clean, belonging to no enemies.
3. Pay attention to good elements, without any involvement with enemies.
4. Establish precisely those components, cadres or individuals, who are responsible for such extension, both at zone, region, district, army, or ministry levels, in order to guarantee the quality of the groups in charge of this task. Do not just introduce generally, to avoid the existence of either burrowing enemies or no-good elements, who may be able to extend new forces with their directions.
II. Paying attention to the continuation of attacking external enemies and
enemies burrowing inside the revolution, so as to eradicate them.
Our party see clearly our success in the elimination of external and internal enemies in the first half of 1977. This is considered as a historic victory following the one gain on April 17 [1975].
At the same time, however, our party is well aware that both external and internal enemies are still striving to fight against our revolution. This is the nature of contradictions between revolution and anti-revolution, between people and oppressing class, between worker class and capitalists, between collectivism and privatization, between socialism and capitalism, between real Marxism-Lenism and anti-revolutionary revisionists, between self-reliance and aggression-ism, expansionism, colonialism, imperialism, etc. This kind of antagonism exists permanently in the international arena, particularly in our society, while opponent class exist in the world as well as in our society.
Therefore, our party resolves that the whole party, the whole army and the whole population must go on with both external and internal enemies, drawing on the experiences and in compliance with the party principles and slogans of "isolation of enemies". By doing so, [we] can gather forces as many as possible, by strategy number 1, strategy number 2, technique number 1, technique number 2, do whatsoever until the enemies are separated and going to vanish from the international arena one after another.
The request for the second half of 1977 is to pay attention to sweeping cleanly away enemies in bases, especially in cooperatives.
III. Starting the storming attacks to achieve the plan of 3-6 tons per hectare
for the second half of 1977.
Based on our basic preparation in combination with the active combat in the first half of 1977, we must encourage the involvement of reaching the goal of 3-6 tons per hectare without fail. To reach this goal, the following issues must be notified:
First is to strengthen and extend the qualification in terms of materials, that is, being self-mastery in water, fertilizer, seeds, fertile soil, farming techniques (sowing, transplanting, plowing, raking, preparing farmland, irrigation, labor force of people, and labor force of animal...etc.
Second is the party's storming attacks. This is a key issue. Continuation must be made to strengthen and extend, and improve commanders on each battle. Go on with political, ideological, and organizational works. Grasp hold of situations of all field, especially the issue of water so that active involvement may happen in small, medium, and large scale: farming mid-term rice, long term rice, and growing other secondary crops. Improve guidelines on effective activities in all fields, such as the use of water, organization of forces for taking care of transplanted rice, sowing and pulling seedlings. These works must be organized according to real circumstances, notably the use of machinery, in order that by the end of this year, these works are done on time and in self-reliance. Sowing, transplanting, and harvesting must be followed one another in order not to waste time.
To simply put, it requires that commanders be strong in all fields so that 3-6 tons per hectare will be achieved from now up to December 1977, but in some places where there are objective obstacles, February 1978.
Our party determines that the rear base must have good management of forces for diversification of crops according to their reasons, (i.e. corn, potatoes), strategic trees for fruits, etc. Commanders of the rear base must be organized with instructions from core members on a daily, ten-day and monthly basis, so as to make the slogans work. "The rear base and the front must work together to achieve the party's 3-6 tons per hectare." "The rear base is the backbone of the front."
IV. Striving to solve and improve the people's living standards as rationed
by the party.
Based on the party's ration, the whole party, especially cadres who are responsible for important tasks at all levels, together with our army and people, must endeavor to solve the people's problems of living, to guarantee their health, particularly in three these three consecutive months—July, August, and September. Any places where are qualified must go ahead to achieve the party's plan, while those places where there are weaknesses, must seek alternative solutions to fulfil the plan. For any places where meet too many weaknesses, experiences of 1976 will be their lessons for encouraging the involvement of settling food problems as hard as they can, based on the standpoint of self-mastery, self-reliance, more importantly in order to build and spread the in-depth standpoint of self-mastery and self-reliance among [people in] the bases, army, and the party. This is a deep political and ideological essence, which is a brilliant capital for our progress toward self-mastery and self-reliance. The way to tackle the problem of people living is to push [people] into growing secondary, strategic crops, including sweet potatoes, potatoes, bean, vegetables, water grass, corn, banana, sugarcane, papaya,...etc. By growing such crops, the problem can be settled for the time being and for the future. Meanwhile, there must attention to the issue of rice, which will yield in the near future. The issue of sugar is also to be solved to improve some degree of people's living standard. Besides, there must be mutual support within the framework of district, region, zone, and the whole country in case of shortages of possibilities of solutions.
The party's request is that from the next year dry season, the eating ration must be guaranteed during the whole year. Technical preparation should be made for the purpose of a three-meal ration: breakfast with potatoes, porridge or other foods, plus main lunch and dinner. This plan is to be implemented from 1978. Therefore, the plans of rice production and crop diversification must be achieved in the rear base. Preparation of forces, cooking pots, firewood, is also the must.
Besides food, attention must be paid to the maximum settlement of people's living in other aspects. Improve their living standards, health, hygiene, shelter, clothing, mosquito net, mate, blanket, cooking pots, rice plate, drinking water (wells, small ponds must be made as many as possible in cooperatives).
Our party sees clearly the improvement of our revolutionary movement of Kampuchea, both in the fields of defense of the country, protection of the revolutionary authority, workers and farmers, continuation of socialist revolution, construction of socialism, promulgation of the influence of Kampuchean revolution in the international arena, subjectivity and objectivity. Thus, we are completely convinced that under the leadership of our Communist Party of Kampuchea, with party central, revolutionary army and collective people, being backbone, we must be able to defend the country from now till 1977.
DK Standing Committee Minutes, March 11, 1976
Standing Committee Minutes, March 11, 1976
Documentation Center of Cambodia Catalogue Number: D7562
[Unofficial translation by Bunsou Sour; edited by Prof. David Chandler]
MINUTE OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE
THE FRONT
11 March 1976
PARTICIPANTS: COMRADE SECRETARY GENERAL [Pol Pot]
COMRADE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL [Noun Chea]
COMRADE VORN [Vorn Vet]
COMRADE KHIEU [Son Sen]
COMRADE HEM [Khieu Samphan]
COMRADE DOEUN
COMRADE TUM
COMRADE TOUCH
AGENDA: SIHANOUK'S RESIGNATION FROM HIS POST
I. Report on the Resignation of Sihanouk
Comrade HEM reported to the Standing Committee on the resignation of Sihanouk. Sihanouk has sent two letters written in French:
- The first letter conveys his resignation and explains the important reason for which he is resigning. In particular, he emphasizes his various health problems, which do not allow him to continue his work.
- The second letter is a statement addresseed to the people of Democratic Kampuchea informing them that he wishes to resign from his post before the 20th March 1976.
During his meeting respectively with the Ambassadors of Mauritania and Senegal, Sihanouk has also indicated that he categorically resigns. But during his meeting with the Chinese Economic Delegation he grumbled about his illnesses...
II. Angkar's Opinion
1. Reason for his Resignation.
There are two: in the long term and in the short term.
A. In the Long Term: it is the difference of "classes", the difference between the grass roots of the Revolution and his own person and family. He cannot live with us. If in the past he was able to remain with us, it was simply because of his strategy. As we no longer go along with his strategy, he can onlyremain provisionally with us. It is not the first time that Sihanouk has resigned. He did that in 1971 already.
B. In the Short Term: It is a strategic difference together with the grass roots difference. An example was the case when we dispatched our Ambassadors abroad without consulting him. The incident has no importance but he would have thought that we no longer have any need for him. Thus the wrangle over position continues.
But the situation has evolved more thoroughly than before. Outside the country, Sihanouk can work with us. While inside the country he feels completely lost without any future. He is very frustrated. He lacks work, he is bored and the environment that surrounds him, in particular his wife who cries constantly, pushes him to the point that he cannot endure any longer. In the case that he decides to remain with us, that cannot last either, at the most l or 2 years. As he wishes to leave, his leaving now is the best.
2. POSITIVE and Negative aspects of his Resignation
A. Positive Aspects for our Revolution :
- All the people of Kampuchea will feel a hhuge surge of relief. The same applies to all our cadres and military. As far as the world is concerned, there won't be any problem.
- We can resolve the problem of the nominattion in our State Organisation easily. And under these conditions we can work peacefully without any obstacles.
- Our work in External Affairs will thus bee improved because henceforth we will make the decisions ourselves, we will express our position by ourselves. Without Sihanouk we are clean-cut.
B. Negative Aspects for our Revolution
- On the one hand, Vietnam attacks us and ttreats us as being too far to the left. Sihanouk has helped us, so why should we drop him? Vietnam will point out to others, saying something bad about us, but good about themselves. But it is a provisional problem only. If in the final analysis we remain very close to them, we shall certainly have no problem.
- On the other hand, the enemy is about to attack us, but we should let them be for say half a month. But even if Sihanouk had not resigned the enemy will always attacks us, their spies still exist. If the enemy does not cease attacking us, are we going to suffer? No, because they cannot isolate us.
3. MEASURES to be Taken: two directives
A. First directive: We don't reject him. We ask him to remain in the same
position. If he wishes to remain with us, he could remain for 5 months, l or
3 years, as long he would like. If he cannot resist, it is not because of us, it
is not our fault. In fact he won't be able to remain with us. He and his family can see very well that they won't have well-being We don't give him any choice, if he does not wish to remain, too bad for him.
Thus we must go and see him and ask him to excuse us for being unable to pay him visits as often as we would like, because we were very busy. We SHOULD acknowledge reception of his letter. That is why we come together to see him. The Situation of our country is very difficult, very poor, the country must face tremendous difficulties. We must resolve all the problems with
national dignity. It is in this way that we can be truly independent. Our position, including that of the government, is of always recognizing his noble contribution, HIS deeds and efforts for the country, in particular in the international arena.
The [Khmer] Nation owes him its gratitude for his highly patriotic contribution, something which our Assembly has already noted in its resolutions. We respect a lot [our] collective decisions once they have been adopted. But we request that he remains with the people. The people will
preserve his nationalist undertakings and we also will congratulate him and will do our utmost to implement the resolution of our extraordinary session of the National Assembly.
B. Second Directive: in the event that he insists on resigning. We thank him. In the recent past we fought together, shoulder to shoulder. We very much regret his resignation. We shall convoke a meeting of the Council of Ministers to take a decision. If he resigns we won't allow him to leave the country. His departure will render the situation complicated to China. The enemy does not cease to condemn and criticize us. If we refuse to allow him to leave, the enemy can criticize us at least for one month.
Certain reasonable attitudes of Sihanouk show a patriotic spirit, but his wife has no patriotic spirit at all. Consequently, if we are not clear in solving this problem, it is possible that unresolved questions will complicate our tasks later on. Thus we should go for the first solution and if that does not work, adopt the second one.
III. ANGKAR'S OPINION (meeting of 13 March 1976)
Comrade HEM made several reports to the Standing Committee on the Sihanouk problem. He has made a categorical decision to resign. He asks Angkar that it TAKE PITY ON him. HE lowers and humbles himself only requesting Angkar that it accepts his resignation. This resignation is not against us...
Comrade Secretary General pointed out that it is an important question to be decided by the Central Committee of the Party. But Comrade Secretary General has already prepared a number of ideas, which WERE supported by the Standing Committee:
1. To forbid Sihanouk from leaving the country is the first measure to be taken.
2. It is necessary to call a meeting of the Council of Ministers to submit to it reports on the matter, in order for the latter to make a decision and, then, to meet Sihanouk once again, with the presence of Penn NOUTH
It is necessary that arrangements be made to record the conversation with Sihanouk. It is necessary to speak to him in such a way for him to keep UP his hopes and allow the recording of his conversation. It is for our documentation.
3. To dispatch telegrams to the sons of Sihanouk asking them to return as soon as possible, pointing out that they must come for the New Year and the National Day celebration. We must solve this problem once and for all. We must also solve it for the interests of our revolution.
4. Is Our Decision TRUE TO Revolutionary Morality?
a. As the morality of the Revolution or the interests of the Revolution. The morality of the revolution must be based on the interests of the revolution. It is a gain for the revolution. To allow Sihanouk to leave is a loss for the Revolution. In reality, Sihanouk is a meek tiger, which only has its skin and bones left, without claws and the fangs. HIS beard has also been shaven. Thus all that remains is to wait for the day of his death. But if this old tiger is freed in the street, all the children would certainly be afraid of it. Certain old men that did not know this meek tiger would also be afraid.
b. Sihanouk participated with us in our Revolution despite his differences with us. That is the reason why our Party decided that Sihanouk should become President of Democratic Kampuchea. But Sihanouk refuses. Thus it is up to him, he can remain or not, it is his problem.
We consider him as a Senior Personality. We shall not kill him. But vis-a-vis the people and the Nation, Sihanouk must also be punished for his fault of having massacred the people.
Thus our decision is reasonably taken in every respect. We shall not change it. But if he continues to resist us, we shall take measures to liquidate him.
5. Direction of the Evolution of our Revolution:
Consequently, it is necessary to put an end to feudalism. We have reached this stage. The whole feudal regime has been destroyed and definitively dismantled by the Revolution. The Monarchy existing for over 2000 years has finally been dismantled. We do not have any other alternatives. Reactions will certainly take place, but we must follow the path of the Revolution in order to win.
6. Another Measure to be Taken:
Henceforth, Sihanouk shall not be allowed to meet foreign diplomats. We shall give them valid reasons to explain the situation.
Documentation Center of Cambodia Catalogue Number: D7562
[Unofficial translation by Bunsou Sour; edited by Prof. David Chandler]
MINUTE OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE
THE FRONT
11 March 1976
PARTICIPANTS: COMRADE SECRETARY GENERAL [Pol Pot]
COMRADE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL [Noun Chea]
COMRADE VORN [Vorn Vet]
COMRADE KHIEU [Son Sen]
COMRADE HEM [Khieu Samphan]
COMRADE DOEUN
COMRADE TUM
COMRADE TOUCH
AGENDA: SIHANOUK'S RESIGNATION FROM HIS POST
I. Report on the Resignation of Sihanouk
Comrade HEM reported to the Standing Committee on the resignation of Sihanouk. Sihanouk has sent two letters written in French:
- The first letter conveys his resignation and explains the important reason for which he is resigning. In particular, he emphasizes his various health problems, which do not allow him to continue his work.
- The second letter is a statement addresseed to the people of Democratic Kampuchea informing them that he wishes to resign from his post before the 20th March 1976.
During his meeting respectively with the Ambassadors of Mauritania and Senegal, Sihanouk has also indicated that he categorically resigns. But during his meeting with the Chinese Economic Delegation he grumbled about his illnesses...
II. Angkar's Opinion
1. Reason for his Resignation.
There are two: in the long term and in the short term.
A. In the Long Term: it is the difference of "classes", the difference between the grass roots of the Revolution and his own person and family. He cannot live with us. If in the past he was able to remain with us, it was simply because of his strategy. As we no longer go along with his strategy, he can onlyremain provisionally with us. It is not the first time that Sihanouk has resigned. He did that in 1971 already.
B. In the Short Term: It is a strategic difference together with the grass roots difference. An example was the case when we dispatched our Ambassadors abroad without consulting him. The incident has no importance but he would have thought that we no longer have any need for him. Thus the wrangle over position continues.
But the situation has evolved more thoroughly than before. Outside the country, Sihanouk can work with us. While inside the country he feels completely lost without any future. He is very frustrated. He lacks work, he is bored and the environment that surrounds him, in particular his wife who cries constantly, pushes him to the point that he cannot endure any longer. In the case that he decides to remain with us, that cannot last either, at the most l or 2 years. As he wishes to leave, his leaving now is the best.
2. POSITIVE and Negative aspects of his Resignation
A. Positive Aspects for our Revolution :
- All the people of Kampuchea will feel a hhuge surge of relief. The same applies to all our cadres and military. As far as the world is concerned, there won't be any problem.
- We can resolve the problem of the nominattion in our State Organisation easily. And under these conditions we can work peacefully without any obstacles.
- Our work in External Affairs will thus bee improved because henceforth we will make the decisions ourselves, we will express our position by ourselves. Without Sihanouk we are clean-cut.
B. Negative Aspects for our Revolution
- On the one hand, Vietnam attacks us and ttreats us as being too far to the left. Sihanouk has helped us, so why should we drop him? Vietnam will point out to others, saying something bad about us, but good about themselves. But it is a provisional problem only. If in the final analysis we remain very close to them, we shall certainly have no problem.
- On the other hand, the enemy is about to attack us, but we should let them be for say half a month. But even if Sihanouk had not resigned the enemy will always attacks us, their spies still exist. If the enemy does not cease attacking us, are we going to suffer? No, because they cannot isolate us.
3. MEASURES to be Taken: two directives
A. First directive: We don't reject him. We ask him to remain in the same
position. If he wishes to remain with us, he could remain for 5 months, l or
3 years, as long he would like. If he cannot resist, it is not because of us, it
is not our fault. In fact he won't be able to remain with us. He and his family can see very well that they won't have well-being We don't give him any choice, if he does not wish to remain, too bad for him.
Thus we must go and see him and ask him to excuse us for being unable to pay him visits as often as we would like, because we were very busy. We SHOULD acknowledge reception of his letter. That is why we come together to see him. The Situation of our country is very difficult, very poor, the country must face tremendous difficulties. We must resolve all the problems with
national dignity. It is in this way that we can be truly independent. Our position, including that of the government, is of always recognizing his noble contribution, HIS deeds and efforts for the country, in particular in the international arena.
The [Khmer] Nation owes him its gratitude for his highly patriotic contribution, something which our Assembly has already noted in its resolutions. We respect a lot [our] collective decisions once they have been adopted. But we request that he remains with the people. The people will
preserve his nationalist undertakings and we also will congratulate him and will do our utmost to implement the resolution of our extraordinary session of the National Assembly.
B. Second Directive: in the event that he insists on resigning. We thank him. In the recent past we fought together, shoulder to shoulder. We very much regret his resignation. We shall convoke a meeting of the Council of Ministers to take a decision. If he resigns we won't allow him to leave the country. His departure will render the situation complicated to China. The enemy does not cease to condemn and criticize us. If we refuse to allow him to leave, the enemy can criticize us at least for one month.
Certain reasonable attitudes of Sihanouk show a patriotic spirit, but his wife has no patriotic spirit at all. Consequently, if we are not clear in solving this problem, it is possible that unresolved questions will complicate our tasks later on. Thus we should go for the first solution and if that does not work, adopt the second one.
III. ANGKAR'S OPINION (meeting of 13 March 1976)
Comrade HEM made several reports to the Standing Committee on the Sihanouk problem. He has made a categorical decision to resign. He asks Angkar that it TAKE PITY ON him. HE lowers and humbles himself only requesting Angkar that it accepts his resignation. This resignation is not against us...
Comrade Secretary General pointed out that it is an important question to be decided by the Central Committee of the Party. But Comrade Secretary General has already prepared a number of ideas, which WERE supported by the Standing Committee:
1. To forbid Sihanouk from leaving the country is the first measure to be taken.
2. It is necessary to call a meeting of the Council of Ministers to submit to it reports on the matter, in order for the latter to make a decision and, then, to meet Sihanouk once again, with the presence of Penn NOUTH
It is necessary that arrangements be made to record the conversation with Sihanouk. It is necessary to speak to him in such a way for him to keep UP his hopes and allow the recording of his conversation. It is for our documentation.
3. To dispatch telegrams to the sons of Sihanouk asking them to return as soon as possible, pointing out that they must come for the New Year and the National Day celebration. We must solve this problem once and for all. We must also solve it for the interests of our revolution.
4. Is Our Decision TRUE TO Revolutionary Morality?
a. As the morality of the Revolution or the interests of the Revolution. The morality of the revolution must be based on the interests of the revolution. It is a gain for the revolution. To allow Sihanouk to leave is a loss for the Revolution. In reality, Sihanouk is a meek tiger, which only has its skin and bones left, without claws and the fangs. HIS beard has also been shaven. Thus all that remains is to wait for the day of his death. But if this old tiger is freed in the street, all the children would certainly be afraid of it. Certain old men that did not know this meek tiger would also be afraid.
b. Sihanouk participated with us in our Revolution despite his differences with us. That is the reason why our Party decided that Sihanouk should become President of Democratic Kampuchea. But Sihanouk refuses. Thus it is up to him, he can remain or not, it is his problem.
We consider him as a Senior Personality. We shall not kill him. But vis-a-vis the people and the Nation, Sihanouk must also be punished for his fault of having massacred the people.
Thus our decision is reasonably taken in every respect. We shall not change it. But if he continues to resist us, we shall take measures to liquidate him.
5. Direction of the Evolution of our Revolution:
Consequently, it is necessary to put an end to feudalism. We have reached this stage. The whole feudal regime has been destroyed and definitively dismantled by the Revolution. The Monarchy existing for over 2000 years has finally been dismantled. We do not have any other alternatives. Reactions will certainly take place, but we must follow the path of the Revolution in order to win.
6. Another Measure to be Taken:
Henceforth, Sihanouk shall not be allowed to meet foreign diplomats. We shall give them valid reasons to explain the situation.
DK Constitution
DK Constitution
The Cambodian Constitutions (1953-1993)
Collected and Introduced by Raoul M. Jennar
Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)
After the vote on 18 March 1970 dismissing him as Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk sent out an appeal from Peking for an armed uprising against the regime, which had taken power in Phnom Penh. The Communist movement which had been fighting the regime since 1968 rallied to the Prince, who created the Front National Uni du Kampuchea (FUNK) and a related Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale du Kampuchea (GRUNK).
The North Vietnamese Army and the Vietcong brought decisive support to the embryonic FUNK forces. Little by little, the most radical elements of Cambodian communism—dubbed Khmer Rouge as early as 1970 by Prince Sihanouk—began to increase their influence within FUNK, of which they took control from 1973 on. The Vietnamese forces, which had signed the Paris Agreements at the beginning of the year, retreated to the frontier zones. While "frontism" remained the political practice in the combat zones, the first purges and massacres commenced in the so-called "liberated zones". Sihanouk supporters, moderate communists (or those suspected of sympathy for Hanoi) and reticent people, were the principal victims.
On 17 April 1975 the Khmer Rouge forces entered Phnom Penh and set up the regime named Democratic Kampuchea.
During a command group meeting in the Cambodian capital from 15 to 19 December 1975, the text of a Constitution was adopted, the principles of which had been decided at the end of April. It was promulgated on 5 January 1976.
To establish this unofficial translation in English, we have relied on the translation published by David Chandler, "The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea: The Semantics of Revolutionary Change", Pacific Affairs, Fall 1976; and Craig Etcheson, The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea, Colorado, Westview, 1984.
Preamble
On the basis of the sacred and fundamental desires of the people, workers, peasants, and other labourers as well as those of the fighters and cadres of the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army; and
Whereas a significant role has been played by the people, especially the workers, poor peasants, the lower middle peasantry, and other strata of labourers in the countryside and cities, who account for more than ninety-five percent of the entire Kampuchean nation, who assumed the heaviest responsibility in waging the war for the liberation of the nation and the people, made the greatest sacrifices in terms of life, property, and commitment, served the front line relentlessly, and unhesitatingly sacrificed their children and husbands by the thousands for the fight on the battlefield;
Whereas great sacrifices have been borne by the three categories of the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army who fought valiantly, day and night, in the dry and rainy season, underwent all sorts of hardship and misery, shortages of food, medicine, clothing, ammunition, and other commodities in the great war for the liberation of the nation and the people;
Whereas the entire Kampuchean people and the entire Kampuchean Revolutionary Army desire an independent, unified, peaceful, neutral, non-aligned, sovereign Kampuchea enjoying territorial integrity, a national society informed by genuine happiness, equality, justice, and democracy without rich or poor and without exploiters or exploited, a society in which all live harmoniously in great national solidarity and join forces to do manual labour together and increase production for the construction and defence of the country;
And whereas the resolution of the Special National Congress held on 25, 26 and 27 April 1975 solemnly proclaimed recognition and respect for the above desires of the entire people and the entire Kampuchean Revolutionary Army;
The Constitution of Kampuchea states:
Chapter One
The State
Article 1 The State of Kampuchea is an independent, unified, peaceful, neutral, non-aligned, sovereign, and democratic State enjoying territorial integrity.
The State of Kampuchea is a State of the people, workers, peasants, and all other Kampuchean labourers.
The official name of the State of Kampuchea is "Democratic Kampuchea".
Chapter Two
The Economy
Article 2 All important general means of production are the collective property of the people's State and the common property of the people's collectives.
Property for everyday use remains in private hands.
Chapter Three
Culture
Article 3 The culture of Democratic Kampuchea has a national, popular, forward-looking, and healthful character such as will serve the tasks of defending and building Kampuchea into an ever more prosperous country.
This new culture is absolutely opposed to the corrupt, reactionary culture of the various oppressive classes and that of colonialism and imperialism in Kampuchea.
Chapter Four
The Principle of Leadership and Work
Article 4 Democratic Kampuchea applies the collective principle in leadership and work.
Chapter Five
Legislative Power
Article 5 Legislative power is invested in the representative assembly of the people, workers, peasants, and all other Kampuchean labourers.
This Assembly shall be officially known as the "Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly".
The Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly shall be made up of 250 members, representing the people, the workers, peasants, and all other Kampuchean labourers and the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army. Of these 250, there shall be:
Representing the peasants 150
Representing the labourers and other working people 50
Representing the revolutionary army 50
Article 6 The members of the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly are to be elected by the people through direct and prompt general elections by secret ballot to be held throughout the country every five years.
Article 7 The People's Representative Assembly is responsible for legislation and for defining the various domestic and foreign policies of Democratic Kampuchea.
Chapter Six
The Executive Body
Article 8 The administration is a body responsible for executing the laws and political lines of the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly.
The administration is elected by the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly and must be fully responsible to the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly for all its activities inside and outside the country.
Chapter Seven
Justice
Article 9 Justice is administered by people's courts, representing and defending the people's justice, defending the democratic rights and liberties of the people, and condemning any activities directed against the people's State or violating the laws of the people's State.
The judges at all levels will be chosen and appointed by the People's Representative Assembly.
Article 10 Actions violating the laws of the people's State are as follows:
Dangerous activities in opposition to the people's State must be condemned to the highest degree.
Other cases are subject to constructive re-education in the framework of the State's or people's organisations.
Chapter Eight
The State Presidium
Article 11 Democratic Kampuchea has a State Presidium chosen and appointed by the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly once every five years.
The State Presidium is responsible for representing the State of Democratic Kampuchea inside and outside the country in keeping with the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea and with the laws and political lines of the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly.
The State Presidium is composed as follows: a president, a first vice-president, and a second vice-president.
Chapter Nine
The Rights and Duties of the Individual
Article 12 Every citizen of Kampuchea enjoys full rights to a constantly improving material, spiritual, and cultural life.
Every citizen of Democratic Kampuchea is guaranteed a living.
All workers are the masters of their factories.
All peasants are the masters of the rice paddies and fields.
All other labourers have the right to work.
There is absolutely no unemployment in Democratic Kampuchea.
Article 13 There must be complete equality among all Kampuchean people in an equal, just, democratic, harmonious, and happy society within the great national solidarity for defending and building the country together.
Men and women are fully equal in every respect.
Polygamy is prohibited.
Article 14 It is the duty of all to defend and build the country together in accordance with individual ability and potential.
Chapter Ten
The Capital
Article 15 The capital city of Democratic Kampuchea is Phnom Penh.
Chapter Eleven
The National Flag
Article 16 The design and significance of the Kampuchean national flag are as follows:
The background is red, with a yellow three-towered temple in the middle.
The red background symbolises the revolutionary movement, the resolute and valiant struggle of the Kampuchean people for the liberation, defence, and construction of their country.
The yellow temple symbolises the national traditions of the Kampuchean people, who are defending and building the country to make it ever more prosperous.
Chapter Twelve
The National Emblem
Article 17 The national emblem consists of a network of dikes and canals, which symbolise modern agriculture, and factories, which symbolise industry. These are framed by an oval garland of rice ears, with the inscription "Democratic Kampuchea" at the bottom.
Chapter Thirteen
The National Anthem
Article 18 The national anthem of Democratic Kampuchea is the "Dap Prampi Mesa Chokchey" ["Glorious Seventeenth of April"].
Chapter Fourteen
The Kampuchean Revolutionary Army
Article 19 The three categories of the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army—regular, regional, and guerrilla—form an army of the people made up of men and women fighters and cadres who are the children of the labourers, peasants, and other Kampuchean working people. They defend the State power of the Kampuchean people and of independent, unified, peaceful, neutral, non-aligned, sovereign, and democratic Kampuchea, which enjoys territorial integrity, and at the same time they help to build a country growing more prosperous every day to improve and develop the people's standard of living.
Chapter Fifteen
Worship and Religion
Article 20 Every citizen of Kampuchea has the right to worship according to any religion and the right not to worship according to any religion.
Reactionary religions which are detrimental to Democratic Kampuchea and Kampuchean people are absolutely forbidden.
Chapter Sixteen
Foreign Policy
Article 21 Democratic Kampuchea fervently and earnestly desires to maintain close and friendly relations with all countries sharing a common border and with all those near and distant throughout the world in conformity with the principles of mutual and absolute respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Democratic Kampuchea adheres to a policy of independence, peace, neutrality and non-alignment. It will permit absolutely no foreign country to maintain military bases on its territory and is resolutely opposed to all forms of outside interference in its internal affairs, and to all forms of subversion and aggression against Democratic Kampuchea from outside, whether military, political, cultural, social, diplomatic, or humanitarian.
Democratic Kampuchea refuses all intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, and scrupulously respects the principle that every country is sovereign and entitled to manage and decide its own affairs without outside interference.
Democratic Kampuchea remains absolutely within the great family of non-aligned nations.
Democratic Kampuchea strives to promote solidarity with the peoples of the Third World in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and with peace- and justice-loving people the world over, and to contribute most actively to mutual aid and support in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and in favour of independence, peace, friendship, democracy, justice, and progress in the world.
The Cambodian Constitutions (1953-1993)
Collected and Introduced by Raoul M. Jennar
Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)
After the vote on 18 March 1970 dismissing him as Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk sent out an appeal from Peking for an armed uprising against the regime, which had taken power in Phnom Penh. The Communist movement which had been fighting the regime since 1968 rallied to the Prince, who created the Front National Uni du Kampuchea (FUNK) and a related Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale du Kampuchea (GRUNK).
The North Vietnamese Army and the Vietcong brought decisive support to the embryonic FUNK forces. Little by little, the most radical elements of Cambodian communism—dubbed Khmer Rouge as early as 1970 by Prince Sihanouk—began to increase their influence within FUNK, of which they took control from 1973 on. The Vietnamese forces, which had signed the Paris Agreements at the beginning of the year, retreated to the frontier zones. While "frontism" remained the political practice in the combat zones, the first purges and massacres commenced in the so-called "liberated zones". Sihanouk supporters, moderate communists (or those suspected of sympathy for Hanoi) and reticent people, were the principal victims.
On 17 April 1975 the Khmer Rouge forces entered Phnom Penh and set up the regime named Democratic Kampuchea.
During a command group meeting in the Cambodian capital from 15 to 19 December 1975, the text of a Constitution was adopted, the principles of which had been decided at the end of April. It was promulgated on 5 January 1976.
To establish this unofficial translation in English, we have relied on the translation published by David Chandler, "The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea: The Semantics of Revolutionary Change", Pacific Affairs, Fall 1976; and Craig Etcheson, The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea, Colorado, Westview, 1984.
Preamble
On the basis of the sacred and fundamental desires of the people, workers, peasants, and other labourers as well as those of the fighters and cadres of the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army; and
Whereas a significant role has been played by the people, especially the workers, poor peasants, the lower middle peasantry, and other strata of labourers in the countryside and cities, who account for more than ninety-five percent of the entire Kampuchean nation, who assumed the heaviest responsibility in waging the war for the liberation of the nation and the people, made the greatest sacrifices in terms of life, property, and commitment, served the front line relentlessly, and unhesitatingly sacrificed their children and husbands by the thousands for the fight on the battlefield;
Whereas great sacrifices have been borne by the three categories of the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army who fought valiantly, day and night, in the dry and rainy season, underwent all sorts of hardship and misery, shortages of food, medicine, clothing, ammunition, and other commodities in the great war for the liberation of the nation and the people;
Whereas the entire Kampuchean people and the entire Kampuchean Revolutionary Army desire an independent, unified, peaceful, neutral, non-aligned, sovereign Kampuchea enjoying territorial integrity, a national society informed by genuine happiness, equality, justice, and democracy without rich or poor and without exploiters or exploited, a society in which all live harmoniously in great national solidarity and join forces to do manual labour together and increase production for the construction and defence of the country;
And whereas the resolution of the Special National Congress held on 25, 26 and 27 April 1975 solemnly proclaimed recognition and respect for the above desires of the entire people and the entire Kampuchean Revolutionary Army;
The Constitution of Kampuchea states:
Chapter One
The State
Article 1 The State of Kampuchea is an independent, unified, peaceful, neutral, non-aligned, sovereign, and democratic State enjoying territorial integrity.
The State of Kampuchea is a State of the people, workers, peasants, and all other Kampuchean labourers.
The official name of the State of Kampuchea is "Democratic Kampuchea".
Chapter Two
The Economy
Article 2 All important general means of production are the collective property of the people's State and the common property of the people's collectives.
Property for everyday use remains in private hands.
Chapter Three
Culture
Article 3 The culture of Democratic Kampuchea has a national, popular, forward-looking, and healthful character such as will serve the tasks of defending and building Kampuchea into an ever more prosperous country.
This new culture is absolutely opposed to the corrupt, reactionary culture of the various oppressive classes and that of colonialism and imperialism in Kampuchea.
Chapter Four
The Principle of Leadership and Work
Article 4 Democratic Kampuchea applies the collective principle in leadership and work.
Chapter Five
Legislative Power
Article 5 Legislative power is invested in the representative assembly of the people, workers, peasants, and all other Kampuchean labourers.
This Assembly shall be officially known as the "Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly".
The Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly shall be made up of 250 members, representing the people, the workers, peasants, and all other Kampuchean labourers and the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army. Of these 250, there shall be:
Representing the peasants 150
Representing the labourers and other working people 50
Representing the revolutionary army 50
Article 6 The members of the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly are to be elected by the people through direct and prompt general elections by secret ballot to be held throughout the country every five years.
Article 7 The People's Representative Assembly is responsible for legislation and for defining the various domestic and foreign policies of Democratic Kampuchea.
Chapter Six
The Executive Body
Article 8 The administration is a body responsible for executing the laws and political lines of the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly.
The administration is elected by the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly and must be fully responsible to the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly for all its activities inside and outside the country.
Chapter Seven
Justice
Article 9 Justice is administered by people's courts, representing and defending the people's justice, defending the democratic rights and liberties of the people, and condemning any activities directed against the people's State or violating the laws of the people's State.
The judges at all levels will be chosen and appointed by the People's Representative Assembly.
Article 10 Actions violating the laws of the people's State are as follows:
Dangerous activities in opposition to the people's State must be condemned to the highest degree.
Other cases are subject to constructive re-education in the framework of the State's or people's organisations.
Chapter Eight
The State Presidium
Article 11 Democratic Kampuchea has a State Presidium chosen and appointed by the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly once every five years.
The State Presidium is responsible for representing the State of Democratic Kampuchea inside and outside the country in keeping with the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea and with the laws and political lines of the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly.
The State Presidium is composed as follows: a president, a first vice-president, and a second vice-president.
Chapter Nine
The Rights and Duties of the Individual
Article 12 Every citizen of Kampuchea enjoys full rights to a constantly improving material, spiritual, and cultural life.
Every citizen of Democratic Kampuchea is guaranteed a living.
All workers are the masters of their factories.
All peasants are the masters of the rice paddies and fields.
All other labourers have the right to work.
There is absolutely no unemployment in Democratic Kampuchea.
Article 13 There must be complete equality among all Kampuchean people in an equal, just, democratic, harmonious, and happy society within the great national solidarity for defending and building the country together.
Men and women are fully equal in every respect.
Polygamy is prohibited.
Article 14 It is the duty of all to defend and build the country together in accordance with individual ability and potential.
Chapter Ten
The Capital
Article 15 The capital city of Democratic Kampuchea is Phnom Penh.
Chapter Eleven
The National Flag
Article 16 The design and significance of the Kampuchean national flag are as follows:
The background is red, with a yellow three-towered temple in the middle.
The red background symbolises the revolutionary movement, the resolute and valiant struggle of the Kampuchean people for the liberation, defence, and construction of their country.
The yellow temple symbolises the national traditions of the Kampuchean people, who are defending and building the country to make it ever more prosperous.
Chapter Twelve
The National Emblem
Article 17 The national emblem consists of a network of dikes and canals, which symbolise modern agriculture, and factories, which symbolise industry. These are framed by an oval garland of rice ears, with the inscription "Democratic Kampuchea" at the bottom.
Chapter Thirteen
The National Anthem
Article 18 The national anthem of Democratic Kampuchea is the "Dap Prampi Mesa Chokchey" ["Glorious Seventeenth of April"].
Chapter Fourteen
The Kampuchean Revolutionary Army
Article 19 The three categories of the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army—regular, regional, and guerrilla—form an army of the people made up of men and women fighters and cadres who are the children of the labourers, peasants, and other Kampuchean working people. They defend the State power of the Kampuchean people and of independent, unified, peaceful, neutral, non-aligned, sovereign, and democratic Kampuchea, which enjoys territorial integrity, and at the same time they help to build a country growing more prosperous every day to improve and develop the people's standard of living.
Chapter Fifteen
Worship and Religion
Article 20 Every citizen of Kampuchea has the right to worship according to any religion and the right not to worship according to any religion.
Reactionary religions which are detrimental to Democratic Kampuchea and Kampuchean people are absolutely forbidden.
Chapter Sixteen
Foreign Policy
Article 21 Democratic Kampuchea fervently and earnestly desires to maintain close and friendly relations with all countries sharing a common border and with all those near and distant throughout the world in conformity with the principles of mutual and absolute respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Democratic Kampuchea adheres to a policy of independence, peace, neutrality and non-alignment. It will permit absolutely no foreign country to maintain military bases on its territory and is resolutely opposed to all forms of outside interference in its internal affairs, and to all forms of subversion and aggression against Democratic Kampuchea from outside, whether military, political, cultural, social, diplomatic, or humanitarian.
Democratic Kampuchea refuses all intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, and scrupulously respects the principle that every country is sovereign and entitled to manage and decide its own affairs without outside interference.
Democratic Kampuchea remains absolutely within the great family of non-aligned nations.
Democratic Kampuchea strives to promote solidarity with the peoples of the Third World in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and with peace- and justice-loving people the world over, and to contribute most actively to mutual aid and support in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and in favour of independence, peace, friendship, democracy, justice, and progress in the world.
MANIFESTO OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MEN AND WOMEN'S PERIODICAL
MANIFESTO OF THE PERIODICAL
REVOLUTIONARY YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN
(From Yuvachun Nung Yuvaneari Padevat,
No.1 August 1973,
pp. 1-7.)
In our revolutionary movement today a great mean young men and women have actively sought to join together in both the Alliance of Yuv.K.K. [Communist Youth of Kampuchea] and in patriotic organizations. And these numbers are continually growing in an orderly way. Today, all over the country, the membership of he Alliance of Yuv.K.K. counts by tens of thousands of people. In the offices and departments there are tens of thousands of young men and women. In the armed forces of all three categories (village militia, regional forces, regular forces) there are also a great many young men and women. Therefore, if we add them together all over the country, the number of young men and women in our revolutionary ranks adds to hundreds of thousands of people, whether Yuv.K.K troops, in offices and departments both at the front lines and the rear ranks.
In sum, all young men and women in our revolutionary ranks have all received continuous constructive education from the party. Therefore, so far, the movement of young men and women has progressed forward both in building each individual and in building a movement of revolutionary struggle. Our many young men and women have joined in revolutionary activities on all battlefields both at the front lines and in rear areas in overflowing numbers.
In order to explode and push the movement of young men and women toward greater strength in accordance with the actual situation, in accordance with our revolutionary movement which is bounding ahead, our Communist Party of Kampuchea, even though pressed by other matters, nevertheless definitely needs to build an organ to educate-construct-nurture the principle of revolutionary political consciousness in our young men and women following the direction and the policy approach of the party in order that [this principle] becomes more clearly defined. That organ is this periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women which appears monthly. This periodical is an organ of revolutionary youth and is under the aegis of the party.
The intentions of this periodical aim to serve revolutionary young men and women, taken together, but also to serve all progressive young men and women in the ranks, too. This periodical has a direction toward building our young men's and women's political consciousness and their implementation of assignments which will serve the movement to fight and strive in the front lines and the rear areas as well as in the offices and departments.
Therefore, this periodical is a periodical to lead, explode and push the movement of young men and women to do the concrete work of building-nurturing the principle of political consciousness of the party into the revolutionary youth organization and to acquire [ for the youth movement] and spread experiences both in the matter of political consciousness and regarding the job of implementing various assignments of the revolutionary youth organization. That is to say [this periodical]:
Politically, aims to disseminate, educate, nurture, orient political principles, strategic and tactical; the approach to people’s war of the party; the party’s economic approach; the party’s socio-cultural approach and the party’s foreign policy goals through concrete execution and with experience of building the force of revolutionary young men and women.
Mentally, aims to disseminate, construct, nurture a revolutionary consciousness such as:
-- class consciousness, class struggle, diivision into classes so that our youth have a proper class philosophy;
-- righteous revolutionary principles;
-- national pride, a proper patriotic spirrit. Proletarian nationalism and internationalism of our revolutionary movement in order to explode the national principles of the working class, of the party;
-- precepts of unremitting struggle both wwith the enemy and with nature and in building oneself in order to fulfill duties, large and small, which the party assigns in order to have maximum victory;
-- a spirit of serving the nation and people, especially the people of the bas areas;
-- revolutionary heroism in the task of fighting the enemy at the front lines, increasing production in the rear area, in fulfilling duties well in offices, etc.
-- high spirit of collectivity, ridding oneself of individual interests in favor of the whole, etc
3. In implementing assignments, aims to:
At the front lines explode and push young men and women who are combatants, who are messengers, who are medics, who carry ammunition, food, the wounded, etc., to overcome to fight, rushing to fulfill their individual duties to the maximum; to fight and strive as strongly as possible and always firmly.
In the rear areas explode and push the movement to increase production; the problem of solidarity with the people in general; the problem of doing a job with the people of the bases:
-- increasing pride in the work of manual activities to become closer to the people of the bases;
-- exploding the spirit of the collectivitty; spirit of economizing of collective goods and of time in the officers and departments and worksites and individual jobs.
In all, that is, the aim is of building reflexes of our youth toward the overall good and increasing their understanding and desire for manual activities; that is to say, changing their old worldview progressively and causing the adoption of a new, revolutionary worldview as a replacement.
To summarize, the periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women has a direction toward building a stand of the political consciousness and implementation of assignments of the party and exploding the movement of young men and women so that it becomes increasingly vigorous and strong in the interest of serving the movement to fight and strive onward both at the front lines and in the rear areas. It also builds reserve strength for perpetuating the leadership of the revolutionary movement generally in the future by taking the revolutionary movement concretely, both at the front lines and in the rear areas and offices, and building it by means of the aspects of political consciousness and the task of implementing various assignment.
Therefore, the periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women wishes success to the brave young men and women of Kampuchea wishes good health and strength and a quick intelligence as well as a strong principle of revolutionary consciousness in order to raise the battle standard to fight and strive against the enemy on all front to be as strong as possible and continually gain new great victories.
Long Live the brave young men and women of Kampuchea!
Long Live the periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women!
REVOLUTIONARY YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN
(From Yuvachun Nung Yuvaneari Padevat,
No.1 August 1973,
pp. 1-7.)
In our revolutionary movement today a great mean young men and women have actively sought to join together in both the Alliance of Yuv.K.K. [Communist Youth of Kampuchea] and in patriotic organizations. And these numbers are continually growing in an orderly way. Today, all over the country, the membership of he Alliance of Yuv.K.K. counts by tens of thousands of people. In the offices and departments there are tens of thousands of young men and women. In the armed forces of all three categories (village militia, regional forces, regular forces) there are also a great many young men and women. Therefore, if we add them together all over the country, the number of young men and women in our revolutionary ranks adds to hundreds of thousands of people, whether Yuv.K.K troops, in offices and departments both at the front lines and the rear ranks.
In sum, all young men and women in our revolutionary ranks have all received continuous constructive education from the party. Therefore, so far, the movement of young men and women has progressed forward both in building each individual and in building a movement of revolutionary struggle. Our many young men and women have joined in revolutionary activities on all battlefields both at the front lines and in rear areas in overflowing numbers.
In order to explode and push the movement of young men and women toward greater strength in accordance with the actual situation, in accordance with our revolutionary movement which is bounding ahead, our Communist Party of Kampuchea, even though pressed by other matters, nevertheless definitely needs to build an organ to educate-construct-nurture the principle of revolutionary political consciousness in our young men and women following the direction and the policy approach of the party in order that [this principle] becomes more clearly defined. That organ is this periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women which appears monthly. This periodical is an organ of revolutionary youth and is under the aegis of the party.
The intentions of this periodical aim to serve revolutionary young men and women, taken together, but also to serve all progressive young men and women in the ranks, too. This periodical has a direction toward building our young men's and women's political consciousness and their implementation of assignments which will serve the movement to fight and strive in the front lines and the rear areas as well as in the offices and departments.
Therefore, this periodical is a periodical to lead, explode and push the movement of young men and women to do the concrete work of building-nurturing the principle of political consciousness of the party into the revolutionary youth organization and to acquire [ for the youth movement] and spread experiences both in the matter of political consciousness and regarding the job of implementing various assignments of the revolutionary youth organization. That is to say [this periodical]:
Politically, aims to disseminate, educate, nurture, orient political principles, strategic and tactical; the approach to people’s war of the party; the party’s economic approach; the party’s socio-cultural approach and the party’s foreign policy goals through concrete execution and with experience of building the force of revolutionary young men and women.
Mentally, aims to disseminate, construct, nurture a revolutionary consciousness such as:
-- class consciousness, class struggle, diivision into classes so that our youth have a proper class philosophy;
-- righteous revolutionary principles;
-- national pride, a proper patriotic spirrit. Proletarian nationalism and internationalism of our revolutionary movement in order to explode the national principles of the working class, of the party;
-- precepts of unremitting struggle both wwith the enemy and with nature and in building oneself in order to fulfill duties, large and small, which the party assigns in order to have maximum victory;
-- a spirit of serving the nation and people, especially the people of the bas areas;
-- revolutionary heroism in the task of fighting the enemy at the front lines, increasing production in the rear area, in fulfilling duties well in offices, etc.
-- high spirit of collectivity, ridding oneself of individual interests in favor of the whole, etc
3. In implementing assignments, aims to:
At the front lines explode and push young men and women who are combatants, who are messengers, who are medics, who carry ammunition, food, the wounded, etc., to overcome to fight, rushing to fulfill their individual duties to the maximum; to fight and strive as strongly as possible and always firmly.
In the rear areas explode and push the movement to increase production; the problem of solidarity with the people in general; the problem of doing a job with the people of the bases:
-- increasing pride in the work of manual activities to become closer to the people of the bases;
-- exploding the spirit of the collectivitty; spirit of economizing of collective goods and of time in the officers and departments and worksites and individual jobs.
In all, that is, the aim is of building reflexes of our youth toward the overall good and increasing their understanding and desire for manual activities; that is to say, changing their old worldview progressively and causing the adoption of a new, revolutionary worldview as a replacement.
To summarize, the periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women has a direction toward building a stand of the political consciousness and implementation of assignments of the party and exploding the movement of young men and women so that it becomes increasingly vigorous and strong in the interest of serving the movement to fight and strive onward both at the front lines and in the rear areas. It also builds reserve strength for perpetuating the leadership of the revolutionary movement generally in the future by taking the revolutionary movement concretely, both at the front lines and in the rear areas and offices, and building it by means of the aspects of political consciousness and the task of implementing various assignment.
Therefore, the periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women wishes success to the brave young men and women of Kampuchea wishes good health and strength and a quick intelligence as well as a strong principle of revolutionary consciousness in order to raise the battle standard to fight and strive against the enemy on all front to be as strong as possible and continually gain new great victories.
Long Live the brave young men and women of Kampuchea!
Long Live the periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women!
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